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Abstract
We used computer proof-checking methods to verify the correctness of
our proofs of the propositions in Euclid Book I. We used axioms as close
as possible to those of Euclid, in a language closely related to that used
in Tarski’s formal geometry. We used proofs as close as possible to those
given by Euclid, but filling Euclid’s gaps and correcting errors. Euclid
Book I has 48 propositions; we proved 235 theorems. The extras were
partly “Book Zero”, preliminaries of a very fundamental nature, partly
propositions that Euclid omitted but were used implicitly, partly advanced
theorems that we found necessary to fill Euclid’s gaps, and partly just vari-
ants of Euclid’s propositions. We wrote these proofs in a simple fragment
of first-order logic corresponding to Euclid’s logic, debugged them using
a custom software tool, and then checked them in the well-known and
trusted proof checkers HOL Light and Coq.
1 Introduction
Euclid was the “gold standard” of rigor for millenia. The Elements of Euclid
set the standard of proof used by Isaac Newton in his Principia and even Abra-
ham Lincoln claimed to have read all ten books of Euclid and learned from it
how to prove something in court. The Elements also inspired the form of the
American Declaration of Independence. In the modern era, beginning already
in the nineteenth century, the standards of proof in mathematics became more
demanding, and the imprecisions and gaps in Euclid were more apparent than
before. Even before that time, some mathematicians focused on the perceived
flaw that the Fifth Postulate (the “parallel postulate”, or “Euclid 5”) was less
intuitively evident than the other four.1 Efforts to remove this “flaw” by prov-
ing Euclid 5 led to the development of non-Euclidean geometry, showing that
in fact Euclid 5 was a necessary postulate, not a flaw.
1Proclus [38], writing in the fifth century, said that Euclid 5 needed a proof, and tried to
supply one; and he was not the first, since he also criticized a previous attempt by Ptolemy.
See [21], Ch. 5 for further history.
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Nevertheless there are flaws in Euclid, and we want to discuss their nature by
way of introduction to the subject.2 The first gap occurs in the first proposition,
I.1, in which Euclid proves the existence of an equilateral triangle with a given
side, by constructing the third vertex as the intersection point of two circles.
But why do those two circles intersect? Euclid cites neither an axiom nor a
postulate nor a common notion. This gap is filled by adding the “circle–circle”
axiom, according to which if circle C has a point inside circle K, and also a
point outside circle K, then there is a point lying on both C and K.
There is, however, a second gap in the proof of I.1. Namely, the proposition
claims the existence of a triangle, which by definition is (or at least is determined
by) three non-collinear points.3 Why are the three points in question not all
on a line? Intuitively, if they were, then one would be between the other two,
violating Euclid’s common notion that the part is not equal to the whole, since
all the sides are equal.
A formal proof of Prop. I.1 cannot follow Euclid in ignoring this issue. The
proposition that if B is between A and C then AB is not equal to AC therefore
must precede proposition I.1, unless one is to consider it as an axiom formalizing
one of Euclid’s common notions. In the next section, we discuss the axioms and
postulates of Euclid, and how we have chosen to render them in modern first-
order form.
The two gaps in I.1 illustrate two common failures. Many of the gaps in
Euclid fall into one of these categories:
(i) A failure to prove that a point clearly shown in the diagram actually
exists, e.g. that two lines really do intersect, or as in I.1 two circles.
(ii) A failure to prove that points shown in the diagram to be non-collinear,
are in fact non-collinear.
(iii) A failure to prove that a point shown in the diagram to be between two
other points, is in fact between those points.
Another example of an error of type (i) is in the second paragraph of
Prop. I.44, “let FG be drawn through to H”. Here H has not been proved
to exist, a strange omission in that a few lines later Euclid does feel the need to
use Postulate 5 to prove that K exists; but then two lines later “let HA, GB
be produced to the points L, M”. That is, the lines shown as intersecting at
L and M do in fact intersect–but Euclid offers no justification for that line of
the proof. There are dozens of such fillable gaps in Euclid’s proofs, some more
easily filled than others.
Not every error in Euclid falls into these categories, however. Consider
Prop. I.9, in which Euclid bisects an angle. The method is to lay off the same
length on both sides of the angle, and then construct an equilateral triangle
2It is customary to refer to the propositions of Euclid with notation like I.44, which means
Proposition 44 of Book I.”
3Euclid never defines triangle, although he does define right triangle and equilateral tri-
angle. Instead he mentions trilateral figure, which is “contained by three straight lines.” We
read that to imply non-collinearity, for otherwise there would be only one line, and nothing
“contained.”
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on the base thus formed. Connecting the vertex of the original angle with the
vertex of the equilateral triangle, we get the angle bisector. Oops, but the two
b b
A
B
C
b
b
P
Figure 1: Euclid’s proof of I.9. What if B = P? Even if B 6= P ,
why does BP lie in the interior of ABC, i.e., why does it meet
AC?
points might coincide! Well, in that case we ought to have drawn the other
equilateral triangle, on the other side of the base. But Prop. I.1 did not provide
for the construction of two triangles, and we cannot easily construct “the other
one.” We certainly need to expand the list of ways in which Euclid’s proofs fall
short by at least two more items:
(iv) A failure to prove that points shown in the diagram to be distinct are
in fact distinct.
(v) A failure to show that points are on the same side (or opposite sides) of
a line, as the diagram shows them to be.
Even if we could solve these problems, the proof of I.9 still would not be
correct, since we would still need to show that the angle bisector constructed
does in fact lie in the interior of the angle. That difficulty brings us to an
important point. There is no “dimension axiom” in Euclid to guarantee that
we are doing plane geometry. Hence “circles” are really “spheres”, and rather
than just two equilateral triangles on a given base, there are infinitely many.
BP might not even lie in the same plane as AC! So even if the vertex of the
equilateral triangle is distinct from the vertex of the original angle, why does
the line between them lie in the interior of the angle? In fact that would be a
problem even in two dimensions–an example of (iii) above.
Even if it were possible to fix that problem by adding a dimension axiom,
that would not be desirable. Euclid didn’t just forget to write down a dimension
axiom. In Book X and beyond, Euclid works in three-space, and the culmination
of the whole series of books is the study of the Platonic solids. Hence it is clear
that Euclid is not meant to be restricted to plane geometry. In the absence of a
3
dimension axiom, it is good advice to the reader to visualize “circles” as spheres.
Then the two circles used in I.1 have not just two but many intersection points.
The circle–circle axiom only guarantees the existence of one intersection point.4
Therefore we conclude that Euclid’s proof of I.9 is fatally flawed. We prove it
another way: by first showing how to bisect a line, and then using that to bisect
an angle. The simple and ingenious proof that a line can be bisected if it is the
base of an isosceles triangle was apparently not noticed until Gupta’s thesis in
1965 [23], but could very well have been discovered by Euclid.
The fact that there is no dimension axiom is not always remembered in
Book I, and is the source of several difficulties. A good example is Prop. I.7,
which says that if ABC is a triangle and ABD is another triangle congruent to
ABC (that is, AC = AD and BC = BD), and C and D are on the same side of
AB, then C is equal toD. Look at the figure for I.7; in two dimensions it appears
contradictory, but as soon as you think that it might be in three dimensions, the
contradiction disappears. The statement of Prop. 7 does correctly include the
hypothesis that C and D are on the same side of AB, but Euclid never uses that
hypothesis in the proof. That is not surprising, since he never defined “same
side”, so he had no possible way to use that hypothesis. It should have been
used to verify the claim that angle DCB is less than angle DCA, because there
is a point of intersection of AD and CB. This turns out to not be provable, even
after proving a number of more basic propositions in “Book Zero”; we could not
prove I.7 without using “dropped perpendiculars”, which are only constructed
much later in Euclid.
A well-known geometer told us “there are no errors in Euclid”, in the sense
that the statements of all the propositions are true in the plane. If we supply
Tarski’s definition of “same side”, an even stronger version of that claim is
true: the statements of all the propositions are true in every finite-dimensional
space Rn. However, the same cannot be said of the proofs. Many of these have
problems like those of I.9 and I.7; that is, we could fix these problems only by
proving some other propositions first, and the propositions of the first half of
Book I had to be proved in a different order, namely 1,3,15,5,4,10,12,7,6,8,9,11,
and in some cases the proofs are much more difficult than Euclid thought. After
proving those early propositions, we could follow Euclid’s order better, and
things went well until Prop. 44. In Propositions 44 and 47 there are numerous
points of difficulty, which took extra propositions to resolve. As one example we
mention the proposition that every square is a parallelogram, which Euclid uses
implicitly in proving Prop. 47. (By definition a square has equal sides and four
right angles, and a parallelogram is a quadrilateral with opposite sides parallel.)
Euclid could and should have proved that.
The aims of the project reported on in this paper are as follows:
(i) Fix Euclid’s axioms (and common notions), using an axiom system rather
4Since Euclid did not state the axiom, one could consider strengthening it to state the
existence of an intersection point on a given side of the line connecting the centers of the
circles. But Euclid also did not say in I.1 or I.9 anything about this problem; and we are able
to prove I.9 from the more fundamental form of circle–circle.
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close to Euclid’s, but including axioms about betweenness that Euclid omitted,
and with other changes discussed below.
(ii) Give correct proofs of all the propositions in Book I from the new axioms,
following Euclid’s proofs as closely as possible.
(iii) Show that those proofs are indeed correct by checking the proofs using
the proof-checking programs HOL Light and Coq.
(iv) Show that the axioms are indeed correct by computer-checking proofs
that the axioms hold in the Cartesian plane R2.5
Accordingly, in this paper we limit the discussion of geometry to the descrip-
tion of the axioms, the description of a few specific flaws in Euclid’s reasoning,
and a discussion of Euclid’s notion of “equal figures” that is necessary to verify
the axioms we use about that notion. Our focus in this paper is on proof check-
ing. What we report on here would still have been worth doing, even if there
were no gaps or errors in Euclid. The details of our proofs, and a discussion
of the errors in the original proofs of Euclid, will be published separately, with
a focus on the geometry and on the correspondence between the axioms and
proofs of Euclid and those of our formal development. That will necessitate a
longer discussion than is possible here.
The formal proofs themselves, as well as the PHP and ML scripts that we
used, are available on the Web. Look for links to them at
http://www.michaelbeeson.com/research/CheckEuclid/index.php
They are also available as ancillary files to the version of this paper posted on
ArXiv.
2 History
A scholarly history of the previous attempts to axiomatize Euclidean geometry
would require a long paper in itself; we offer only a few highlights here. But
before beginning, we point out that axiomatizing Euclidean geometry is not
quite the same as axiomatizing Euclid: the former aims at an axiom system
that permits the derivation of important theorems, regardless of whether the
axioms or the proofs are similar to Euclid’s axioms and proofs; the latter pays
attention to those points.
The best known attempt is Hilbert’s 1899 book [25]. Hilbert had been a
vocal proponent of the axiomatic method, and his book was probably meant
partly to illustrate that method on the example of geometry. First-order logic
was in its infancy and Hilbert’s system was not first order. He made use of
Archimedes’s axiom, and his continuity “axiom” is a strange mixture of logic
and model theory.6 The fundamental idea to use betweenness and congruence
5The axioms hold in Fn, where F is any Euclidean field (an ordered field in which positive
elements have square roots), but we have not computer-checked a proof of that fact, even for
n = 2; we did check R2.
6It can be viewed as a second-order axiom involving quantification over models of the other
axioms.
5
as primitive relations goes back to Pasch[35]. Further contributions by Mollerup
[32], Veronese [44], Pasch [35], and Peano[36] are discussed below in connection
with the axioms they helped to develop. After Hilbert, the most important
work is the axiom system of Tarski. This is a first-order system, and not only is
it first-order, it is points-only, meaning that there are variables only for points.
Lines are given by two points, and angles by three points, and equality between
angles is a defined notion. This fits Euclid very well: Euclid almost always
refers to lines by two points, and angles by three points. Tarski’s system was
developed in 1927, but publication was long delayed; for the history see the
introduction to (the Ishi press edition of) [40]. Although a development of
Euclid in Tarski’s system could have been done in the 1960s at Berkeley, it was
not done. Instead efforts focused on reducing the number of Tarski’s axioms
by finding dependencies, and on proving fundamental results like the existence
of perpendiculars and midpoints without using the parallel postulate or any
continuity axioms. The results of these efforts finally appeared in [40], which
contains the remarkable results of [23].
In spite of a century of effort, in 2017 we did not possess any formal analysis
of Euclid’s proofs, for Hilbert and Tarski had both aimed at avoiding the circle
axioms and developing segment arithmetic, while Euclid uses the circle axioms
and the last half of Book I is based on the equal-figure axioms (discussed in
§7). Even if we add the circle axioms, the last half of Book I can be proved
in Hilbert or Tarski’s theories only after the long and difficult development of
segment arithmetic, so that “equal figures” can be defined as “equal area.”
It is now 35 years since the publication of [40], and meantime, the technology
of proof checking by computer has advanced. Our predecessors stopped at the
threshold, so to speak, by working on neutral geometry and minimal axioms
systems, instead of formalizing Euclid. We serendipitously find ourselves in the
situation where it is possible for us to take up that task, and also to verify (using
existing computer proof checkers) that our proofs are flawlessly correct.
3 Language
Euclid did understand the fundamental point that not every fact can be proved;
the first fact accepted could not be proved because there would be nothing to
prove it from. But he did not understand that similarly, not every concept
can be defined. Thus he famously attempted to define “point” and “line” and
“rectilinear angle.” (The Greeks also considered “angles” formed by curved
sides.) These natural-language “definitions” are not mathematical usable; so in
practice Euclid treated points, angles, circles, and lines all as primitive notions.
In addition, Euclid treated “figures” as a primitive notion, in the sense that
he never made use of the circular and vague definitions he offered.7 In Book
I, only triangle and quadrilaterals are used. Euclid also accepted concepts of
“equal” and “greater than” for each of points, angles, circles, lines, and figures
7 A figure is that which is contained by a boundary; a boundary is that which is an
extremity of anything.
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without definition (but curiously, there is no “greater than” for figures). In
the middle of the nineteenth century, it was recognized that “betweenness” and
“equidistance” were good primitives for geometry, and later it was realized that
it is possible to work with angles represented by triples of points, instead of
taking them as primitive, so angle equality and inequality are defined concepts.
That is what we do in our formal work. Thus all our axioms, except those
mentioning circles, are formulated in a “points-only” language, in which the
fundamental relations are betweenness and equidistance.
Betweenness is a 3-ary relation B(A,B,C), which Euclid wrote as “B lies
on the finite straight line AC,”, or (for example in Prop. I.14) as “AB and BC
lie in a straight line.” We interpret B as strict betweenness, i.e. the endpoints
do not lie on the line.8
Collinearity is the relation L(A,B,C) expressing that either two of the points
are equal or one lies between the other two. This is a statement about points
only. It seems that for Euclid, lines were primitive objects, rather than sets,
and the incidence relation (point lies on line) too fundamental even to notice,
as it does not occur in the list where “point” and “line” are “defined.” Whether
close to Euclid or not, we use the first-order formulations of betweenness (a
primitive) and collinearity (defined).9
“Equidistance” is a 4-ary relation representing the congruence of finite lines,
“AB is equal to CD”. Euclid, or at least his translator Heath, used “equal”
rather than “congruent”. (The word “equidistance” is also not faithful to Euclid,
who never spoke of distances.)
There is one exception to our “points-only” approach. In order to follow
Euclid more closely, we allow giving a name to a circle. Circles are given by
point and radius, so we can say “J is a circle with center P and radius AB.”
(Here the “radius” is not a number but a finite line.) This is expressed by the
formula CI(X,C,A,B), using a primitive relation symbol CI. We do not make
use of equality between variables of the sort for circles.
Euclid never gives circles a single-character name as we do. Nor does he
name circles by center and radius, or center and point-on-circle. Instead he
names circles by listing three points that lie on the circle. One of those points
is a point that appears to exist in the diagram, and is conjured into existence
without proof by the act of naming it. This naming technique papers over
the lack of the circle–circle axiom in Euclid, and introduces a gap into the
proof every time it is used. We therefore must deviate from Euclid’s naming
convention for circles.
Betweenness and equidistance are sufficient as primitive relations for ele-
mentary geometry, but the latter part of Euclid Book I uses another primitive
8Hilbert used strict betweenness; Tarski used non-strict betweenness, on purpose because
the degenerate cases could be used to reduce the number of axioms. We use strict betweenness,
on purpose to avoid degenerate cases that express unintended things and have to be separately
worried about.
9Most of the time Euclid’s lines are finite, which may confuse a modern reader at first,
since today finite lines are called “segments”, and “line” means “infinite line.” Hilbert made
(infinite) lines primitive objects, but treated finite lines (segments) as sets of points.
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relation, “equal figures”, which is discussed in §7. We mention it here only
to note that the complete definition of our language requires inclusion of the
primitive relations discussed in §7.
4 Definitions
Euclid gives a long list of definitions at the beginning of Book I. We do the
same. Euclid’s list has some important omissions, notably “same side” and
“opposite side”. These are defined in Fig. 2.10 Euclid defined “square” but
omitted “parallelogram” and “rectangle”. He defined “parallel lines” to be lines
that do not meet but lie in the same plane (thus illustrating that his omission of
a dimension axiom was no accident!) On the other hand, he failed to define “lies
in the same plane”. Once we have defined “same side” as in Fig. 2, it is easy to
define “lies in the same plane”, as each line and point not on the line determine
two half-planes, together making up a plane. In the formal statement of “same
side”, a line is specified by two distinct points p, q, and the incidence of x on
that line is expressed by “p, q, x are collinear”. Formally we use the relation
L(p, q, x) defined above in terms of betweenness. This definition exemplifies
how one works with points only, avoiding the explicit mention of lines. The
price one has to pay for this simplification is that one then has to prove that it
doesn’t matter which particular points p, q we chose to represent the line. That
is, “same side” is invariant if p and q are changed to some other pair of distinct
points each of which is collinear with p and q.
p q
b
a
b b
x
p q
b
a
b
b
y
x
c
Figure 2: (Left) a and b are on the opposite side of pq. (Right)
a and b are on the same side of pq if there exist points x and y
collinear with pq, and a point c, such that B(a, x, c) and B(b, y, c).
Euclid’s failure to define “lies in the same plane” leaves us to complete
his definition of “parallel”. First, we discuss the “not meeting” part of the
definition. Lines in Euclid are finite, but “parallel” is about infinite lines. So
10This definition is due to Tarski [40]. Hilbert had planes as a primitive concept, and
discussed “same side” and “opposite side” only in the context of a fixed plane, using a definition
that would not work without having planes as a primitive concept. Tarski’s definition of “same
side” is vital for making possible a points-only formalization that would work in more than
two dimensions.
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“AB does not meet CD” means that no matter how those two finite lines are
produced, the lengthened lines still do not have a point in common. In other
words, there is no point collinear with both AB and CD. On the other hand,
“AB crosses CD” means that there is a point both between A and B, and
between C and D.
We define “Tarski-parallel” by “AB and CD do not meet, and C and D
lie on the same side of AB.” This is clearly not what Euclid intended, as to
Euclid it seems obvious that if AB is parallel to CD then CD is parallel to AB.
So we define instead that AB is parallel to CD if there is no point collinear
with both AB and CD, and there are four points a, b, c, d with a and b collinear
with AB, and c, d collinear with CD, and ad crosses bc. With this definition,
there is a very short proof of the symmetry property. On the other hand, the
two definitions can be proved equivalent. It follows that if AB and CD are
parallel then A and B are on the same side of CD, which is quite often actually
necessary, but never remarked by Euclid.
Euclid defines a square to be a quadrilateral with at least one right angle, in
which all the sides are equal.11 He does not specify that all four vertices lie in the
same plane. This is not trivial to prove, but we did prove it, so Euclid’s definition
does not require modification. Euclid does not define “rectangle”. One would
like to define it as a quadrilateral with four right angles. It is a theorem that
such a figure must lie in a plane. However, the proofs we found involve reasoning
“in three dimensions”. Even though Euclid Book I has no dimension axiom, and
we must therefore be careful not to assume one, nevertheless all the proofs in
Book I deal with planar configurations. We therefore define “rectangle” to be
a quadrilateral with four right angles, whose diagonals cross, that is, meet in a
point. This condition is one way of specifying that a rectangle lies in a plane.
We can then prove that a rectangle is a parallelogram.
The Appendix contains a complete machine-generated list of our definitions.
5 Angles
We take only points and circles as primitive objects. Angles are treated as
ordered triples of non-collinear points, ABC. The point B is the vertex of the
angle. Equality of angles is a 6-ary relation, which we write informally as “angle
ABC = abc”. The definition is that there exist four points (one on each side of
each angle) that form, with the vertices B and b, two congruent triangles. (Two
triangles are congruent, by definition, if all three pairs of corresponding sides
are equal.)12 This definition does not permit “straight angles”, “zero angles”,
or angles “greater than 180 degrees.” Such “angles” are also not used in Euclid.
A point F lies in the interior of angle ABC if it is between two points lying
on the two sides of the angle. Angle ordering is defined by abc < ABC if angle
11But in I.46 and I.47 the proofs work as if the definition required all four angles to be right,
so we take that as the definition.
12This is not the same definition as used in [40], but it works, and seems simpler to us;
perhaps the one in [40] seems simpler in the presence of function symbols for line extension.
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abc is equal to angle ABF , for some F in the interior of ABC. Note that these
definitions make sense without any dimension axiom; that is, they work fine in
three-space.
We then have to prove as theorems those properties of angle equality and
ordering that Euclid assumed as “common notions”: reflexivity, symmetry, and
transitivity of angle equality; the fact that angle ABC is equal to angle CBA;
transitivity of angle ordering. The fact that an angle cannot be both equal
to and less than the same angle is quite difficult to prove, although taken for
granted by Euclid in several proofs. That is, of course, the key result needed to
prove antisymmetry and trichotomy for angle ordering.
Hilbert [25] took angles as primitive, and had an axiom about copying angles
that specified the uniqueness of the copied angle. The uniqueness assumption
builds in as an axiom the property that an angle cannot be both less than and
equal to itself. Since this can be proved, it might be considered an imperfection
to assume it as an axiom. While Hilbert took angles and equality of angles as
primitive, he did define angle ordering just as we do. Because of the uniqueness
part of his angle-copying axiom, he had no difficulty proving trichotomy.
6 Axioms and Postulates
Euclid had three groups of what would now be called axioms: common notions,
axioms, and postulates. The common notions were intended to be principles
of reasoning that applied more generally than just to geometry. For exam-
ple, what we would now call equality axioms. The axioms and postulates were
about geometry. The distinction between an “axiom” and a “postulate”, ac-
cording to Proclus [38], p. 157, is that a postulate asserts that some point can
be constructed, while an axiom does not. In modern terms an “axiom” is purely
universal, while a postulate has an existential quantifier.
Heath’s translation lists five common notions, five postulates, and zero ax-
ioms. Simson’s translation [17] lists three postulates, twelve axioms, and zero
common notions. The extra axioms are discussed by Heath on p. 223 of [18],
where they are rejected.
6.1 Euclid’s Common Notions
Euclid’s first common notion is “things equal to the same thing are equal to
each other.” That is,
a = c ∧ b = c→a = b.
Modern mathematicians would prefer
a = c ∧ c = b→a = b.
But then, they need symmetry as a separate axiom (a = b→b = a), while that
can be proved from Euclid’s axiom above. We follow Euclid in this matter,
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although of course it is of no serious consequence.13
Euclid’s fourth common notion is “Things which coincide with one another
are equal to one another.” We take this to justify reflexivity. We consider the
transitivity, reflexivity, and symmetry of point equality to be part of logic.
When “equality” refers to congruence of lines, these principles correspond
to three congruence axioms. We also need the axiom that AB is equal to BA.
In other words, Euclid’s lines are not directional. Euclid never explicitly states
this principle, but it is often necessary when formalizing his proofs. Perhaps
Euclid would regard AB and BA as “coincident”, in which case this axiom is
covered by common notion 4, quoted above.
Euclid himself used common notion 4 to justify his “proof” of the SAS
principle I.3 by “superposition”. We reject this proof, and that leaves only AB =
BA and reflexivity of congruence, point equality, and figures to correspond to
common notion 4.
Angle equality is a defined concept and its properties are theorems, not
axioms. Equality of figures is axiomatized in §7.
Euclid’s fifth common notion is “The whole is greater than the part.” In our
formalism, inequality of finite lines AB < CD is defined as “AB is equal to CE
for some E between C and D.” Thus common notion 5 (for lines) is built into
the definition. Then “the whole is not equal to the part” (for lines) becomes
AB < CD implies AB is not equal to CD, which boils down to the principle
partnotequalwhole:
B(A,B,C)→¬AB = AC.
This is a theorem, not an axiom, in our development.
Euclid’s second common notion is “If equals be added to equals, the wholes
are equal”, and the third common notion is “If equals be subtracted from equals,
the remainders are equal.” Common notion 2 becomes our axiom sumofparts,
which says that if AB = ab and BC = bc and B(A,B,C) and B(a, b, c), then
AC = ac. Here AB and BC are “parts” and AC is the “whole” made by
“adding” the two lines. The related principle differenceofparts, correspond-
ing to common notion 3, is proved, rather than assumed as an axiom; there is
a fuller discussion in §6.6. Angle inequality is a defined notion and there are no
axioms about it. These two common notions justify several of the axioms for
figures, which are discussed in §7.
Equality also enjoys the substitution property for each predicate in our lan-
guage:
B(a, b, c) ∧ a = A ∧ b = B ∧ c = C→B(A,B,C)
ab = cd ∧ a = A ∧ b = B ∧ c = B ∧ d = D→AB = CD
and similarly for the predicates for “equal figures.” In practice, the proofs are
checked assuming the second-order property:
a = b→∀P (P (a) ⇐⇒ P (b))
13Apparently Euclid considered symmetry too obvious to mention. Or maybe, he considered
“A = B” and “B = A” to just be different expressions of the same proposition, rather than
different but equivalent propositions.
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which allows to avoid introducing a separate axiom for each predicate. That
is, we do not actually use the substitution axioms for individual predicates, but
allow the substitution of A for B in any derived formula, when A = B or B = A
has been derived. Such substitutions are often needed in formalizing Euclid’s
proofs, so even if he did not explicitly state the principle, he understood it.
A complete machine-generated list of the common notions is in the Ap-
pendix.
6.2 Betweenness Axioms
Euclid never made explicit mention of betweenness, ignored all places where
it should have been proved, and had no axioms for proving betweenness state-
ments. We will not discuss the historical origins of the following axioms, nor the
possibilities for reducing their number (this is certainly not a minimal set, but
the proofs required to eliminate some of these axioms are long and difficult.)
We give them the names they are given in our formal development, which is
why there are no spaces in those names.
¬B(a, b, a) betweennessidentity
B(a, b, c)→B(c, b, a) betweennesssymmetry
B(a, b, d) ∧B(b, c, d)→B(a, b, c) innertransitivity
The following axiom is called connectivity and can be rendered in English
as “If B and C lie on the finite straight line AD, and neither is between A and
the other, then they are equal.”
Formally:
B(a, b, d) ∧B(a, c, d) ∧ ¬B(a, b, c) ∧ ¬B(a, c, b)→b = c
This principle was expressed in antiquity as “a straight line cannot enclose
an area.”14 It is closely related to the principle known in modern times as
“outer connectivity”, which says that if line AB has two extensions C and D
then either C is between B and D or D is between B and C. We prove outer
connectivity as a theorem from the connectivity axiom.15
14 It is discussed by Proclus [38], p. 126, who thinks it superfluous as it is included in the
meaning of Postulate 1. Apparently Simson was not convinced, as his translation [17] lists
it as an axiom. Heath rejects it as an axiom (p. 232 of [18]), not on mathematical grounds,
but because he came to the conclusion that it is an “interpolation”, i.e., is not in the original
Euclid, in spite of being included in three of the “best manuscripts.”
15Outer connectivity was discussed already by Proclus, who stated it as “two straight lines
cannot have a common segment” [38], p. 168-9, §216-17. Proclus says it is implicit in Euclid’s
line extension axiom. Neverthless, Proclus considers some possible proofs of it–but not the
ingenious proof offered by Potts in the commentary to Prop. I.11 in [37], p. 14, which shows
that outer connectivity follows from perpendiculars and the fact that an angle cannot be less
than itself. The latter, however, is a difficult theorem, if it (or a close equivalent) is not
assumed as an axiom.
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6.3 Extension of lines
Euclid postulated that every line can be extended, but (at least in Heath’s
translation) did not say by how much.16 We render Euclid 1 as
If A 6= B then there exists C with B(A,B,C).
Tarski postulated instead that every line AB can be extended by the amount
CD; that is, there exists a point E such that B(A,B,E) ∧ BE = CD. Since
Euclid’s lines have distinct endpoints, it should be required that both A 6= B
and C 6= D.
There is an intermediate form we call localextension, in which you are
allowed to extend AB by the amount BC; that is, the segment used to measure
the extension and the segment to be extended have a common endpoint.
Euclid’s Prop. I.2 asserts that given any point A and line CD there is a
point E with AE = CD. The Tarski extension postulate renders Prop. I.2
superfluous. That is a matter of some regret, since I.2 has a beautiful proof.
Clearly the Tarski extension postulate goes beyond what Euclid had in mind;
therefore we assume only Euclid 1 as stated above.
The line-circle axiom says that if P is inside circle C then any line through
P meets C. This axiom is discussed fully in §6.10 below, but it is relevant to
line extensions, because if we have a circle with center at B, then line-circle
enables us to extend AB by the radius of the circle. In this way one shows
that Euclid 2 and line-circle together imply localextension, since the circle
needed for a local extension can be drawn with a collapsible compass. With
localextension, we can carry out the proof of I.2, and after I.2 we can prove
the Tarski extension principle. From there on the development is unaffected by
the choice not to assume the Tarski extension principle as an axiom, but our
weaker axiom exactly reflects what Euclid used and permits us to prove I.2 as
he did.
The key to this development is the “bootstrapping” aspect of it: one needs
I.2 to prove the Tarski extension principle with line-circle, but one needs some
extensions by a given amount to prove I.2, so it appears at first that Euclid 1 is
not sufficient; so we first prove localextension, then use it to prove I.2, then
prove Tarski extension. For this to work it is also necessary that “inside” be
correctly defined and that the line-circle axiom be correctly formulated; there
are several wrong ways to do these things. Euclid did not give us a complete
proof to follow, since he did not state or use any version of line-circle, and did
not define “inside” which is the key task in formulating line-circle.
6.4 Five-line Axiom
Euclid attempted, in Proposition I.4, to prove the side-angle-side criterion for
angle congruence (SAS). But his “proof” appeals to the invariance of triangles
16The Simson translation [17] renders the extension postulate as “That a terminated straight
line may be produced to any length in a straight line.” Perhaps Euclid’s extension postulate
said more than Heath’s translation indicates.
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under rigid motions, about which there is nothing in his axioms, so for centuries
it has been recognized that in effect SAS is an axiom, not a theorem.
Instead of SAS itself, we take an axiom known as the “five-line axiom.”
This axiom is illustrated in Fig. 3. Its conclusion is, in effect, the congruence of
triangles dbc and DBC in that figure. Its hypothesis expresses the congruence
(equality, in Euclid’s phrase) of angles dbc andDBC by means of the congruence
of the exterior triangles abd and ABD.
d
a b c
D
A B C
Figure 3: If the four solid lines on the left are equal to the cor-
responding solid lines on the right, then the dashed lines are also
equal.
Our version of the five-line axiom was introduced by Tarski, although we
have changed non-strict betweenness to strict betweenness.17
6.5 Pasch’s Axiom
Pasch [35] introduced the axiom that bears his name, in the form that says that
if a line enters a triangle through one side, it must exit through another side
(or vertex). That version, of course, is only true in a plane. Seven years later,
Peano [36] introduced what are now called “inner Pasch” and “outer Pasch”,
which work without a dimension axiom.18 See Fig. 4. In that figure, we use the
convention that solid dots indicate points assumed to exist, while an open circle
indicates a point that is asserted to exist.
Technically “Pasch’s axiom” should be “Pasch’s postulate”, since it makes
an existential assertion, but the terminology is too well-established to change
now.
17The history of this axiom is as follows. The key idea (replacing reasoning about angles
by reasoning about congruence of segments) was introduced (in 1904) by J. Mollerup [32].
His system has an axiom closely related to the 5-line axiom, and easily proved equivalent.
Tarski’s version [43], however, is slightly simpler in formulation. Mollerup (without comment)
gives a reference to Veronese [44]. Veronese does have a theorem (on page 241) with the same
diagram as the 5-line axiom, and closely related, but he does not suggest an axiom related to
this diagram.
18Axiom XIII in [36] is outer Pasch, with B(a, b, c) written as b ∈ ac. Axiom XIV is inner
Pasch. Peano wrote everything in formal symbols only, and eventually bought his own printing
press to print his books himself.
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Figure 4: Inner Pasch (left) and outer Pasch (right). Line pb
meets triangle acq in one side ac, and meets an extension of side
cq. Then it also meets the third side aq. The open circles show
the points asserted to exist.
6.6 Degenerate cases.
Tarski was always interested in minimizing the number of axioms, and was
happy if allowing “degenerate” cases in axioms allowed one to combine what
would otherwise be several separate axioms. Tarski’s versions of Pasch’s axiom
allow all the points to lie on one line. From those degenerate cases one can derive
basic principles about the order of points on a line that we take as separate
axioms. Our reason for requiring a non-collinearity hypothesis in inner and out
Pasch is the principle that axioms should correspond to intuition. If you have
to draw a different picture to convince yourself that the degenerate case is valid,
then that is a different intuition; so generally it should be a different axiom.
Another kind of “degenerate case” is the so-called “null segment” AA. In
Euclid, lines are given by two distinct points, so there is no such thing as the
“line” (or segment) AA. Formally we have the predicate E(A,B,C,D). What
happens then when A = B? The idea that E(A,B,C,D) means that line AB is
equal (congruent) to line CD suggests that it should be false when A = B, since
line AA does not exist. But the idea that E(A,B,C,D) means “equidistance”
suggests that E(A,A,C,D) should be equivalent to C = D. Are null segments
allowed, or not? If they are, we need the axiom E(A,A,C,C) that says “all
null segments are equal”. If they are not, we need ¬E(A,B,C,C). Euclid
gives us no guidance: he only works with lines that have distinct endpoints (no
null segments), but he never says a single word about null segments. We were
(eventually) able to follow Euclid in that respect: we have no axioms either way
about null segments, and our axiom system has models with null segments and
models without null segments. We are “agnostic” about null segments.
It is not a fundamental philosophical issue, as the talk of “null segments” is
just shorthand; nobody suggests that AA is really a line. The argument against
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null segments is that we want to follow Euclid closely. The argument for null
segments is that allowing E(A,A,C,C) is occasionally convenient in allowing
the succinct statement of theorems. For example, congruence is preserved under
reflection in a point, which is called pointreflectionisometry. That is stated
by saying that if B is the midpoint of both AC and PQ, then AP = CQ. That
statement includes the case when A = P : then the conclusion is Q = C. To keep
our theory agnostic, we had to assume A 6= B in pointreflectionisometry,
which complicated the proof of linereflectionisometry. (These theorems do
not occur in Euclid anyway, but we need them to prove Euclid’s Postulate 4, all
right angles are equal.)
The picture of the 5-line axiom illustrates that it is meant to capture the in-
tuition leading to the SAS congruence principle. But when the picture collapses
onto a line, the 5-line axiom makes “one-dimensional” or “linear” assertions
about order and congruence of points on a line. The “degenerate cases” of
the 5-line axiom are when point D lies on the line ABC. What principles
are embodied in those degenerate cases? The cases D = A is sumofparts: if
B(A,B,C) and B(a, b, c), and AB = ab and BC = bc, then AC = ac. The case
D = B in the 5-line axiom similarly is differenceofparts: if B(A,B,C) and
B(a, b, c), and AB = ab and AC = ac, then BC = bc. Euclid did not state
these principles explicitly, but when he used them, he referred to his common
notions about “adding equals to equals” and “subtracting equals from equals”.
Following the principle that there should be a one-to-one correspondence
between intuitions (or diagrams) and axioms, we should impose the extra hy-
potheses in the 5-line axiom thatD is not collinear with AC and d is not collinear
with ac. If one does that, one will need to add at least four more “linear” ax-
ioms (that are now proved with the help of the 5-line axiom) One needs more
than sumofparts and differenceofparts, and we did not discover an ideal
set of axioms to add. Moreover, one can argue intuitively for the unmodified
axiom as follows: when the fourth point is not on the line, the intuition for
the axiom is SAS. But now think of the fourth point moving onto the line; if it
approaches a limit on the line, all the quantities mentioned vary continously, so
the congruences in the 5-line axiom remain true in the limit. The unmodified
axiom makes proofs using it insensitive to the distinction whether point D is or
is not on line AC, and hence it supports intuitionistic proofs, which a restricted
version would not. For these reasons, we retained the unrestricted 5-line axiom.
6.7 Euclid’s Postulate 5
Euclid’s “parallel postulate”, or “Euclid 5”, is a postulate rather than an axiom,
because it asserts that two lines meet, i.e., there exists a point on both lines.
The hypothesis as Euclid stated the postulate involves angles. We use instead
a “points-only” version. Then Euclid’s version becomes a theorem.
Most modern geometry textbooks replace Euclid 5 by “Playfair’s axiom”
(introduced by Playfair in 1729), which asserts the uniqueness of a line parallel
to a given line AB, through a point P not collinear with AB. This also becomes
a theorem in our development. Although it does not occur as a proposition in
16
b
p
b
a
b
q
b
s
b
r
b
t
L
K
M
Figure 5: Euclid 5. Transversal pq of lines M and L makes corre-
sponding interior angles less than two right angles, as witnessed
by a. The shaded triangles are assumed congruent. Then M
meets L as indicated by the open circle.
Euclid, it is several times used implicitly in Euclid’s proofs.19
6.8 Euclid’s Postulate 4
Euclid 4 says “all right angles are equal.” The definition of a right angle is this:
ABC is a right angle if there is a point D such that B(A,B,D) and AB = DB
and AC = DC. It has been claimed since the time of Proclus that Euclid 4
is provable, but since the axioms and definitions were not so precise, we are
not certain that any of the alleged proofs could be counted as correct until the
proof in Tarski’s system presented in [40]. In our system this is a difficult proof,
depending on the fact that both reflection in a point and reflection in a line
are isometries (preserve congruence and betweenness). The proof has to work
without a dimension axiom. It is a very beautiful proof and obviously much
deeper than the “proofs” given by Proclus and Hilbert. The beautiful part of
the proof (after the observation that reflections are isometries) is contained in
Satz 10.15 of [40].
Even though this proof is difficult, it would clearly be a flaw to assume Euclid
4 as an axiom, when it can in fact be proved. Therefore we prove it, rather than
assume it.20
19 Explicitly: Playfair is used directly in propositions 44, 45, 47, and indirectly in 37, 38,
42, 46; and more indirectly in 39, 40, 41, 42, 48; so overall it is used in 39-48 except 43. Euclid
5 is used directly in 29, 39, 42, 44 and indirectly in 29-48 except 31, which is the existence of
the parallel line. Euclid should have proved 31 before 29, to emphasize that Euclid 5 is not
needed for it.
20One may well ask, if we find it necessary to prove Euclid 4 “just because we can”, why do
we not find it necessary to prove one of the two Pasch axioms, inner and outer Pasch, from
the other “just because we can”? The answer is that we still need one of them as an axiom,
and the same intuition that justifies one of them also justifies the other. Therefore there is
no conceptual economy in reducing the number of axioms by one. But proving Euclid 4 does
offer a conceptual simplification.
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6.9 Circle construction axioms
To express our theory in first-order predicate calculus, we use a two-sorted
predicate calculus, one sort for points and one for circles. CI(J,A,B,C) means
that circle J is a circle with center A and radius BC.
Euclid’s Postulate 3 is “To describe a circle with any centre and distance.”
By this, he meant that you can draw a circle with a given center and passing
through a given point. This is often called the “collapsible compass” construc-
tion, as opposed to the “movable compass” or “rigid compass”, that permits
drawing a circle with given center and radius specified by a given line (which
need not have the center as an endpoint). Euclid’s Prop. I.2 shows that the col-
lapsible compass can imitate the movable compass. Past formal systems could
not capture the difference. But in our system, Euclid 3 is directly rendered in
our language as
A 6= B→∃J CI(J,A,A,B)
while the movable compass is
B 6= C→∃J CI(J,A,B,C).
But a priori, J might also have center P and radius QR. That this is not
the case is the content of Euclid’s Prop. III.1. The statement of III.1 is “To
find the centre of a given circle”, but the proof proceeds by showing that two
supposedly different centers must in fact coincide. In our formalism that is
stated: if CI(J,A,B,C) and CI(J, a, b, c) then A = a. (It can be proved that
the radii are equal too: BC = bc.)
We define on(P, J) to mean that for some A, B, and C, J is a circle with
center A and radius BC, and AP = BC. We do not want a circle to be just a
triple of points. That a circle is determined by its center and radius is expressed
by saying that if J is a circle with center A and radius BC, and P is on J , then
AP = BC. This axiom is called circle-center-radius; see the listing of
axioms in an Appendix for a formal statement.
The predicates “inside” and “outside” can be defined using inequality of
finite lines, and the circle–circle continuity axiom can be translated straightfor-
wardly from the informal English version given above. We then define relations
“on” and “inside” and “outside” that take both a point argument and a circle
argument.
6.10 Circle continuity axioms
Euclid had no postulates or axioms about circles other than Euclid 3. There
are three continuity axioms in the literature:
Circle–circle: if circle C has one point inside circle K and one point outside,
then there is a point on both circles.
Line–circle: if line L has a point P inside circle K, then there are two points
A and B on both L and K, such that P is between A and B.
18
Segment–circle: if line L has a point A inside circle K and a point B outside,
then there is a point on K between A and B.
The reader should bear in mind that in the absence of any dimension axioms,
a “circle” is “really a sphere”, or even some kind of “hyper-sphere”.
Circle–circle is used twice in Book I, once in Prop. I.1 and once again in
Prop. I.22, which shows how to construct a triangle with sides congruent to
given lines. (The third vertex is the intersection point of two circles with the
specified radii.) Although Euclid does not explicitly mention the axiom, both
its applicability and necessity are clear, so we take circle–circle as an axiom.
Line–circle is used only twice in Book I, in Prop. I.2 and Prop. I.12, the
construction of a “dropped perpendicular.” We might also consider “one-point
line–circle”, in which the conclusion is weakened to assert only the existence
of a single point common to L and K. Since this axiom is inadequate for the
application to I.12, we do not consider further the idea of using it instead of
line–circle.
Segment-circle has been suggested as an axiom by many authors, including
Tarski (see [43]). But a detailed study shows that it is inadequate; an irre-
movable circularity arises in formalizing Euclid without a dimension axiom. If
we try to construct dropped perpendiculars (Euclid I.12) using segment-circle
continuity, to check the hypotheses we need the triangle inequality (I.20). But
I.19 is needed for I.20, and I.7 for I.19. In Prop. I.7, the two triangles that are
supposed to coincide might lie in different planes, but for the hypothesis that
they lie on the same side of a line, a hypothesis that Euclid stated but never
used. (He could not have used it, since he never defined “same side.“) Even
so, I.7 is more difficult to prove than Euclid thought, since he took for granted
the fact that an angle cannot be less than itself, but that principle is actually
the essential content of I.7. Ever since Hilbert [25], angle inequality has been
regarded as a defined concept, and proving I.7 then requires dropped perpen-
diculars (I.12) (or at least, we could not do without I.12). But this is circular.
The conclusion is that segment-circle continuity is not a suitable axiom to use
in formalizing Euclid’s proofs.21
The fact is that each of line–circle and circle–circle implies the other, in
the presence of the other axioms of Euclid. In the interest of following Euclid
fairly closely, we simply take both as axioms: circle–circle is used in I.1 and I.22
(triangle construction), while line–circle is used in I.12, and both those proofs
are far simpler than the proofs of line–circle and circle–circle from each other.
Even though we take both as axioms, we remark on the equivalence proofs.
The proofs can be found in [24]; see also the last section of [2]. The proof of
line–circle from circle–circle relies on dropped perpendiculars, which in Euclid is
I.12, proved from line–circle. Therefore, a proof of line–circle from circle–circle
must rely instead on Gupta’s circle-free perpendicular construction [23, 40],
21Line–circle continuity does not suffer from this problem, as the triangle inequality is not
required to drop perpendiculars. Of course, as Gupta showed [23], one can construct dropped
perpendiculars without mentioning circles at all, so there is no formal result that one circle
axiom is better for I.7 than another, as none at all is actually needed. We merely say that
Euclid’s proof can be repaired with line–circle, but not with segment-circle.
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carrying us far beyond Euclid. The only known synthetic proof of circle–circle
from line–circle uses the “radical axis” [42].
6.11 What was Euclid thinking?
It seems strange that Euclid, who was generally careful, glaringly omits both
line-circle and circle-circle. When he needs to use line-circle in the proof of I.2,
he instead says “Let the straight line AE be produced in a straight line with
DA”. In other words, “let DA be extended until it meets the circle at E.”
Remember that lines are always finite, so line-circle intuitively says that a line
can be extended until it meets the circle, as well as saying that (when it is long
enough to reach the circle) it cannot pass through the circle at some “missing
point” without touching. Probably Euclid thought the difficulty was getting
the lines long enough, not getting the circle impenetrable. Then he probably
had line-circle in mind when stating Euclid 2, “To produce a finite straight line
continuously in a straight line”, not just “by some amount”, and not “by an
amount equal to a given segment”, but “enough to meet a given circle”, if the
starting point is inside that circle.
7 Equal Figures in Euclid
Euclid defined the word “figure” to mean “that which is contained by a bound-
ary or boundaries”, and explicitly mentioned that a circle counts as a figure
(so boundaries can be curved). But in Book I, figures are triangles and quadri-
laterals, so we do not need to introduce a new primitive sort of variables for
“figure.” Euclid used the word “equal” to denote a relation between figures that
he does not define. One possible interpretation is that equal figures are figures
with the same area. But the word “area” never occurs in Euclid, presumably
because Euclid realized that he did not know how to define area. Thus, instead
of saying “the area of the whole is the sum of the areas of the parts”, Euclid
only reasoned about “equal figures”, without defining that notion.
Nor did Euclid give any explicit axioms about “equal figures”; he treated
these as special cases of the common notions, such as “if equals are added to
equals, the results are equal”, where the “addition” of figures refers to what
we would call the union of disjoint sets. Occasionally he uses without explicit
mention a few further axioms, such as “halves of equals are equal.”
Book I culminates in the Pythagorean theorem, which Euclid states using
the notion of equal figures.22 Although we formalized only Book I in the work
reported here, all the propositions in Book II are about “equal figures”, so a
correct formulation of the notion is critical.
22In fact, he says that the squares on the sides together equal the square on the hypotenuse.
But what he proves is that the square on the hypotenuse can be divided into two rectangles,
each of which is equal the square on one of the sides; so the further notion of two figures
together being equal to a third is not really needed.
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Three ways to make Euclid’s notion of “equal figures” precise have been
proposed in the past. First, one can define two figures to be equal if they have
equal areas. That is not a first-order notion, no matter how area is defined,
because it involves measuring areas by numbers. Second, after introducing
“segment arithmetic” geometrically, one can define area geometrically, but that
is a very great deviation from the path taken by Euclid.
A third interpretation of “equal figures” is the notion of “equal content”,
explained on p. 197 of [24], which involves cutting figures into a finite number
of pieces and reassembling them. That is also not a first-order notion, because
of the “finite number of pieces” part. Hence it is irrelevant for our purposes,
and we need not go into the details of the definition.
Conclusion: the definitions of “equal figure” that we find in the literature
all suffer from one of the following defects:
(i) Not being first order, because of requiring the concept of real number.
(ii) Not being first order, because of requiring the concept of natural number
(even just for equality of triangle and quadrilaterals).
(iii) First order, but requiring the geometrical definition of coordinates and
arithmetic (addition and multiplication of finite lines), which goes well beyond
Euclid.
The introduction of geometrical arithmetic has already been proof checked in
[11], from Tarski’s axioms; and we checked that Tarski’s axioms are equivalent
to those used in this paper, so approach (iii) has already been proof checked.
We are, of course, not the first ones to face these difficulties. Hartshorne
lists (p. 196 of [24]) the properties of “equal figures” that Euclid’s proofs use.
Not all the properties in that list are first order. Our approach to the treatment
of “equal figures” is to treat “equal triangles” and “equal figures” (that is,
equal quadrilaterals) as primitive relations, and give first-order axioms for them,
sufficient to account for Euclid’s proofs. These axioms are first order versions
of Hartshorne’s.
Since we use variables only for points, not for figures, we must use two re-
lations: ET for “equal triangles” and EF for “equal quadrilaterals” or “equal
figures”; it is only for quadrilaterals, but EQ is already taken. The axioms for
these two relations say that ET and EF are equivalence relations; that the order of
vertices can be cyclically permuted or reversed, preserving equality; that congru-
ent triangles are equal; that if we cut equal triangles off of equal quadrilaterals,
producing triangles, the results are equal; or if the cuts produce quadrilaterals,
the results are also equal. Then we have “paste” axioms that allow for pasting
equal triangles onto equal triangles; if the results are quadrilaterals they are
equal, provided also that the triangles do not overlap, which can be ensured
by a hypothesis about vertices lying on opposite sides of the paste-line. Fig. 6
illustrates one of these axioms. Similarly, if pasting equal triangles onto equal
quadrilaterals produces quadrilaterals, they are equal.
Finally we need an axiom that enables us to prove that certain figures are
not equal; all the axioms mentioned so far hold if all figures are equal. Such an
axiom was introduced by de Zolt (see [24], p. 201). But de Zolt’s formulation is
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Figure 6: The axiom paste3. If the lower triangles are equal and
the upper triangles are equal, then the quadrilaterals are equal.
not first order. Instead we take a special case: if ABC is a triangle, and DE is a
line that cuts the triangle (in the sense that B(A,D,B) and B(B,E,C)), then
neither of the two resulting pieces ADE or CDE is equal to ABC). This turns
out to be sufficient. A complete list of our axioms, including all the equal-figures
axioms, is in the Appendix.
8 Book Zero and filling in Book I
We proved more than 230 theorems, including the 48 propositions of Book I. To
list these theorems in the format used in the Appendix requires 14 pages, and
since the files containing these theorems are accessible (as well as the proofs),
we elected not to list them all. Still we wish to give the reader some idea of
the additional theorems that we had to supply. We use the phrase “Book Zero”
informally to encompass those theorems that seem to come before Book I, in
the sense of being used in Book I and not depending on Book I themselves.
Book Zero begins with properties of congruence and betweenness; several im-
portant and often-used lemmas are about the order of four points on a line,
when two betweenness relations are known between them. (There is one axiom
about that, and the rest of the relevant propositions can be proved.) There
are variations on the 5-line axiom; there are theorems about collinearity and
non-collinearity; there is the definition of “less than” for finite lines, and the or-
dering properties of that relation and how it respects congruence (or equality)
of finite lines. Lying on ray AB (which emanates from A and passes through
B) is a defined relation; there are lemmas about how it relates to betweenness
and to collinearity. We can “lay off” a finite line along a ray, and the result is
unique. Euclid says we can “add equals to equals” as a common notion; the
formal version of this is sumofparts, which as we discussed above can either
be an axiom or lemma, depending which version of the 5-line axiom we take.
There is also differenceofparts and subtractequals. Equality and order of
angles are defined concepts, and we have to prove their fundamental properties
in lemmas such as ABCequalsCBA, equalanglestransitive, and so on. The
“crossbar theorem” is also part of Book Zero. The notions of “same side” and
“opposite side” are defined, and their fundamental properties proved, including
the plane separation theorem, according to which if C and D are on the same
side of AB, and D and E are on opposite sides of AB, then C and E are on
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opposite sides of AB; that is, there is a point collinear with AB that is between
C and E. This is where we pass out of Book Zero, however, since the proof of
that theorem requires constructing a midpoint, which is Proposition 10.
Book Zero comprises about seventy theorems; Euclid’s Book I has 48; we
proved an additional hundred of so theorems that are needed to prove Euclid’s
48, or are variants of those propositions, but whose proofs use some of Eu-
clid’s propositions as well. Let us give a typical example: the lemma we call
collinearbetween is used 19 times in our development, including in Proposi-
tions 27,30,32,35,44, and 47. That lemma says that if two lines AB and CD are
parallel, and there is a point E between A and D that is also collinear with BC,
then that point E is actually between B and C. That is not trivial to prove,
and Euclid simply assumes that it is so, because it appears so in the diagram.
The names of some other lemmas will be illustrative:
droppedperpendicularunique, angleordertransitive,
angleorderrespectscongruence, angletrichotomy.
Euclid’s proof of angle bisection in I.9, via I.1, cannot be corrected, and instead
we prove I.10 (line bisection) using Gupta’s 1965 proof, and then prove I.9.
Prop. I.12 (dropped perpendicular) has to precede Prop. I.7 (angle bisection),
because Euclid’s proof of I.7 is hopelessly inadequate, and we give a much
more complicated proof that requires perpendiculars. Once perpendiculars are
available, we prove pointreflectionisometry and
linereflectionisometry, and use them to carry out Szmielew’s proof of Eu-
clid’s Postulate 4 (all right angles are equal). Euclid fails to state
legsmallerhypotenuse, which is needed to prove another fact about right tri-
angles that Euclid uses without proof: the foot of the perpendicular from the
right angle to the hypotenuse actually lies between the two endpoints of the hy-
potenuse. Towards the end of Book I, the steps of the proofs are more cavalier,
and the omitted lemmas are more difficult; for example Euclid omitted to state
and prove that a square is a parallelogram.23
9 Formal representation of Euclid
We wanted to write down our axioms, definitions, postulates, lemmas, and
propositions in a form that would be easy to manipulate by computer, and
independent of any particular computer language, so as to still be readable
decades or centuries hence. We chose to use strings to represent all these things.
Euclid used only one-character variable names, and we did the same. In that
case there seemed no need for commas and parentheses; in other words we used
Polish notation. There were, however, more than 26 relations to consider, so we
used in all cases two-character names for the relations. For example, we write
B(a, b, c) in the form BEabc. AB = CD is written EEABCD. We used EQAB to
23A square has four right angles and equal sides. A parallelogram has both pairs of opposite
sides parallel. But there is also this difficulty: Nothing in the definition of a square requires
the four sides to lie in the same plane. That can be (and hence should be) proved. We
discussed the definition of “parallel” in §4.
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represent A = B, so we could not use EQ a second time, and chose EE instead.
“Parallel” becomes PR, as in PRABCD. There are quite a few of these abbreviated
two-character names, but that is enough to convey the idea. The point is that
every formula is a string. Conjunctions and disjunctions begin with AN or OR
and the subformulas are separated by + or |, respectively. Negations are formed
with NO.
Then we define classes Axiom, Definition, and Theorem, each of which has
fields called label, hypothesis, conclusion, and existential. The label
field is used for the name. The hypothesis and conclusion fields each contain
an array of formulas, or a single formula. The existential field contains an
empty string by default, and if it isn’t empty, that means that it contains a list
of variables that are supposed to be existentially quantified in the conclusion.
We have thus defined a subset of first-order predicate logic. Specifically, our
formulas have no function symbols, and only existential quantifiers; universal
quantification over the free variables is left implicit. Nested quantifiers do not
occur. Polish notation, one-character variables, and two-character predicate
names make it easy to manipulate these formulas as strings and arrays of strings,
and substitutions can be coded as arrays, making unification possible by regular-
expression matching. Every modern programming language has useful libraries
for this sort of thing.
10 Formal proofs
Each proof is a list of lines. Each line contains a formula and optionally a
justification. The proof is kept in a .prf file whose name gives the label of
the theorem it is intended to prove. The proof begins with a sequence of un-
justified lines that must repeat the hypotheses of the theorem. It ends with
a line that is the conjunction of the conclusions of the theorem, or the sole
conclusion if there is only one. The first line after the hypotheses must have
a justification. Any unjustified lines in the rest of the proof must either be
repetitions of earlier lines or must follow by logic alone from some earlier lines.
Justifications follow the pattern kind:label, where kind is either defn, axiom,
postulate, proposition, or lemma, and label is the label of an item of the
specified kind. An axiom, postulate, or definition can be used anywhere, but
a lemma or proposition cannot be used anywhere, because circular arguments
must be prevented.
We avoid circularity by having a “master list” of lemmas and propositions,
which are to be proved in the specified order. A valid proof (of a certain item in
the master list) is only allowed to reference previous items in its justified steps.
Euclid’s proofs, and ours, make use of arguments by contradiction and cases.
We will now explain the syntax we used. An argument by contradiction is
introduced by a line with the justification assumption. After some steps of
proof, this line must be matched by a line with the justification reductio. This
line must contradict the assumption line. By saying that A and B contradict
each other, we mean that one of them is the negation of the other. We found
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it helpful to indent the lines between the assumption and the reductio labels,
especially when nested arguments by cases or reductio occur.
The syntax for cases and proof by contradiction is as illustrated in Fig. 7.
(The example chosen is the proof of Playfair’s form of the parallel postulate,
discussed in §6.7.) The first two lines state the hypothesis, that we have two
lines CD and CE through C, both parallel to AB. The last line states the
desired conclusion, that C, D, and E are collinear, i.e., the two parallel lines
coincide. In the proof, BE means “between” and CR means “crosses”, in the
sense given in the line labeled defn:cross.
We wrote more than two hundred thirty formal proofs in this syntax. For
convenience, we introduce a name for this subset of first-order logic: Euc, the
first three letters of Euclid. We believe that these proofs will be readable, and
computer-checkable, into the indefinite future; in particular, past the lifetime of
the currently popular proof assistants that we used to check the correctness of
these proofs.
Polish notation is not the favorite of some people, including our referee.
But its durability over a long future seems assured–after all it is already more
than a century old. We are sure that the scientists of the future will easily
be able to add parentheses and commas if they prefer to look at the formulas
with those additions; of course they could equally easily strip out the commas
and parentheses, so we think it is not an important issue. With or without
parentheses and commas, we believe a low-level simple formalism is preferable
to a high-level language (for example the Mizar language), because the purpose
of these proofs is to permit easy automatic translation into any desired formal
language, without the necessity of resurrecting a language used in the distant
past. It is not our purpose in this paper to make the proofs easily readable by
humans. That subject will be taken up separately; but our intention is again
that formal Polish-notation proofs be the starting point of a translation into
something that humans like to read.
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PRABCD
PRABCE
NOORCRADBC|CRACBD assumption
ANNOCRADBC+NOCRACBD
NOCRADBC
NOCRACBD
PRABDC lemma:parallelflip
CRACDB lemma:crisscross
ANBEApC+BEDpB defn:cross
BEApC
BEDpB
BEBpD axiom:betweennesssymmetry
ANBEApC+BEBpD
CRACBD defn:cross
ORCRADBC|CRACBD reductio
cases COCDE:CRADBC|CRACBD
case 1:CRADBC
COCDE lemma:Playfairhelper2
qedcase
case 2:CRACBD
ANBEApC+BEBpD defn:cross
BEApC
BEBpD
ANBEBpD+BEApC
CRBDAC defn:cross
PRBACD lemma:parallelflip
PRBACE lemma:parallelflip
COCDE lemma:Playfairhelper2
qedcase
COCDE cases
Figure 7: An illustrative proof, showing the syntax of formulas
and proofs.
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11 Checking the proofs by computer
The proofs described in this paper only need a rather weak logic. There are
no function symbols, and all the statements have a very restricted form. That
made it easy to write a custom-built proof checker, or “proof debugger”, that
we used while developing the formalization. That tool also checks that we stay
within the bounds of that logic.
HOL and Coq use an architecture that guarantees a much higher reliability.
This is called the LCF architecture, after the LCF system from the seventies
that pioneered the approach. This architecture divides the system in a small
kernel (or logical core) and the rest of the code. By the use of abstract datatypes,
the correctness of the mathematics is then guaranteed by the correctness of the
kernel. Whatever errors the rest of the code of the system may contain, the
statements claimed to have been proved will indeed have been proved. In the
case of the HOL Light system (one of the incarnations of HOL), the correctness
of this kernel has even been formally proved (using the HOL4 system, another
incarnation of HOL), which gives an extremely high guarantee that the system
will not have any logical errors.
Our procedure for proof-checking Euclid was thus as follows:
• Write formal proofs in the Euc language, simultaneously checking and
debugging them with our custom proof debugger.
• Translate these proofs into HOL Light or Coq syntax by means of simple
scripts.
• Check the resulting proofs in HOL Light and Coq
Was it necessary to use the Euc language? No, but it is closer to Euclid
than either HOL Light or Coq, and allowed us to write the proofs only once,
and moreover, has a better chance of being readable a thousand years from now.
Was it necessary to write a custom checker or debugger for Euc? Perhaps not,
but it facilitated our work flow by separating the writing of the proofs from
the use of the two major proof assistants, and by providing very useful error
messages in the case of incorrect proofs. Was it necessary to use two proof
assistants? No, since each one is perfectly reliable, but we did it anyway.
The devil might ask whether we have lost something by using higher order
logic to check first order proofs. While it may appear so at first glance, actually
higher order logic itself ensures that we have not. Consider: in higher order
logic (both in Coq and HOL Light) we proved that for any type of points,
and any predicates satisfying the axioms of Euc, all our theorems are satisfied.
In these statements there is a second-order quantification over the predicates
used to interpret betweenness, congruence, and the predicates ET and EF . In
essence we have proved that the axioms hold in any model (of our axioms for
geometry). Then by Go¨del’s completeness theorem, the theorems are actually
first order theorems. However, it is a general feature of higher order theorem
provers that they do not directly check first-order proofs. Moreover, we used
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the Leibniz definition of equality, so indeed our translated proofs are not first
order. However, we did check the first order proofs directly in our custom proof
checker before translating them to higher order logic.
Our debugger also counted the number of inferences. Proofs of more than
200 inferences were not uncommon, but the majority were under 100 inferences.
We also wrote code that analyzed the dependencies between lines of a given
proof. This enabled us to identify and eliminate lines that were never sub-
sequently used. We follow Euclid in sometimes repeating previously deduced
lines just before applying a proposition, to make it apparent that the required
instances of the hypotheses have indeed been derived. These lines, of course, are
technically eliminable; but mainly we wanted to eliminate “red herring” lines
that were actually irrelevant. The automatic detection of such lines was useful.
12 Checking the proofs in HOL Light
To ensure the correctness of the Euclid formalization from the language Euc
to HOL Light, we built a very small custom checker on top of HOL Light, and
used that to check our work for correctness in HOL as well. The source of this
proof checker, proofs.ml, has about a hundred lines, which then is used to
check a translation of the formalization into syntax that HOL Light can process
of almost twenty thousand lines, michael.ml. This last file is created from the
original proof files described above by two small ad hoc scripts, a PHP script
called FreekFiles.php and a Perl script called FreekFiles.pl.
In the HOL system, all input (even the proofs) always consists of executable
ML source code. The proofs of each lemma in our case is checked by calling a
function run_proof (implemented in proofs.ml) on the statement of the lemma
and a list of items of a custom datatype called proofstep. The ML definition
of this datatype is shown in Fig. 8. The output of this function is a HOL thm,
a proved statement. In other words, the ML type of the function that is used
here is:
type proofstep =
| Known of term
| Step of term * thm
| Equalitysub of term
| Assumption of term
| Reductio of term
| Cases of term * term
| Case of int * term
| Cases_ of term
| Qedcase;;
Figure 8: The ML datatype used when checking the proofs with
HOL.
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run_proof : term -> proofstep list -> thm.
The list of proofsteps corresponding to the proof from Fig. 7 is shown in Fig. 9.
In that example some of the choices on how to translate the statements from
the proof to the HOL logic can be seen. For instance, we had to decide whether
to translate EQ to the standard HOL equality, or to have it be a custom relation.
We chose to make use of the features of standard first order logic with equality,
but nothing beyond that. That means that we translated equality to the built-
in equality of the logic, and translated NE identical to NOEQ and NC identical to
NOCO. Therefore the translation does not have predicates EQ, NE and NC. As a
small optimization, NONC was translated without a double negation.
Within HOL we used an axiomatic approach. That is, we added our axioms
to the HOL axioms. That way, we will be verifying that the theorems of Euclid
follow from those axioms, rather than (for example) that they are true in R2 or
R
n. This raised the number of HOL axioms by 36, from the original 3 to 39.
Before stating these 36 axioms we also added two new primitive types. point
and circle, and five new primitive predicates, BE, EE, CI, ET and EF.
There are some differences between what was taken to be axioms in the
original version of the formalization, and what are axioms in the HOL version.
The definitions of the predicates were originally axioms, but in the HOL version
are actual HOL definitions, with the ‘axioms’ being the equivalences that these
definitions produce. Two exceptions for this approach are defn:unequal and
defn:circle of which the first is omitted (it is not used anywhere) and the
second is an axiom (as it does not have the shape of a HOL definition). Also,
defn:inside, defn:outside and defn:on are still axioms, because these also
state that the defining property does not depend on the points that give the
circle, which one does not get from just a definition.
Of the common notions, cn:equalitytransitive,
cn:equalityreflexive, cn:stability and cn:equalitysub are not axioms,
but proved statements, because they only involve equality and are part of the
logic.
The LCF architecture of HOL Light only guarantees that the proofs are
valid in the higher order logic of HOL Light. However, the implementation
in proofs.ml only uses first order tactics (most notably MESON, which is the
main tool used for checking the steps), which shows that the proofs are actually
first order. The proofs, written in the Euc language, contain on each line a
formula and its justification. HOL Light checks that the formula follows from
previous steps of the proof, using the axiom, theorem, or definition mentioned
in the justification, together with first-order logic. The simple logic associated
with Euc allows only instantiation of the axiom, theorem, or definition; or in
proofs by cases and contradiction, some simple propositional logic. Is HOL
Light then really checking the given proof? Yes, it is, because (a) even if it
found a more complicated first-order proof, that would still be a check, and (b)
in any case, HOL Light will not use quantificational logic to prove a theorem
without quantifiers.
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let lemma_Playfair = run_proof
‘PR A B C D /\ PR A B C E ==> CO C D E‘
[
Known ‘PR A B C D‘;
Known ‘PR A B C E‘;
Assumption ‘~(CR A D B C \/ CR A C B D)‘;
Known ‘~CR A D B C /\ ~CR A C B D‘;
Known ‘~(CR A D B C)‘;
Known ‘~(CR A C B D)‘;
Step (‘PR A B D C‘, lemma_parallelflip);
Step (‘CR A C D B‘, lemma_crisscross);
Step (‘BE A p C /\ BE D p B‘, defn_cross);
Known ‘BE A p C‘;
Known ‘BE D p B‘;
Step (‘BE B p D‘, axiom_betweennesssymmetry);
Known ‘BE A p C /\ BE B p D‘;
Step (‘CR A C B D‘, defn_cross);
Reductio ‘CR A D B C \/ CR A C B D‘;
Cases (‘CO C D E‘, ‘CR A D B C \/ CR A C B D‘);
Case (1, ‘CR A D B C‘);
Step (‘CO C D E‘, lemma_Playfairhelper2);
Qedcase;
Case (2, ‘CR A C B D‘);
Step (‘BE A p C /\ BE B p D‘, defn_cross);
Known ‘BE A p C‘;
Known ‘BE B p D‘;
Known ‘BE B p D /\ BE A p C‘;
Step (‘CR B D A C‘, defn_cross);
Step (‘PR B A C D‘, lemma_parallelflip);
Step (‘PR B A C E‘, lemma_parallelflip);
Step (‘CO C D E‘, lemma_Playfairhelper2);
Qedcase;
Cases_ ‘CO C D E‘;
];;
Figure 9: The HOL counterpart of the proof in Fig. 7.
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The full check of the twenty thousand lines is uneventful, but not very fast,
mostly because of the use of the rather heavy MESON. It takes several minutes.
At some points MESON has to work very hard (it loses the fact that the conclusion
of the lemma exactly matches the step being proved, and is trying many possible
ways to unify the parts). For these cases proofs.ml contains two custom lower
level tactics, SUBGOAL_UNFOLD_TAC and SUBGOAL_MATCH_TAC, which do not use
MESON.
13 Checking the proofs in Coq
13.1 Formalizing the Axioms
The axioms in our axiomatization of Euclid are of two kinds: axioms related
to definitions and others. Axioms that serve as definition as those of the form:
∀x, P (x) ⇐⇒ Q(x). We translate them to a proper Coq definition to reduce
the number of axioms. Technically, in Coq, we did not use the Axiom keyword.
Because axioms are similar to global variables in a programming language, they
reduce the re-usability of the code. We sorted the axioms into several groups,
and defined them in Coq using type classes. Then, the axioms are given as so-
called section variables of Coq, a mechanism which allows to have the axioms
as an implicit assumption for each lemma. For propositions I.1 to I.28 and I.30
we do not use the fifth postulate of Euclid. For propositions I.1 to I.34, we
do not need the equal-figure axioms. Avoiding the Axiom keyword allows us
to reuse the proofs in a different setting by proving the axioms in Coq as a
second-order property either from another axiom system or by constructing a
model (see Sec.14.1).
Equality Wemodel the equality using Coq’s built-in equality: Leibniz’s equal-
ity. We could also have assumed an equivalence relation and substitution prop-
erties for each of the predicates of the language.
13.2 Verifying the proofs
Proof assistants differ in their mathematical foundations (e.g. type theory, higher
order logic (HOL), or set theory) and their proof language. In procedural style
proof assistants (e.g. Coq and HOL Light), proofs are described as a sequences
of commands that modify the proof state, whereas in proof assistants that use
a declarative language (e.g Mizar and Isabelle), the proofs are structured and
contain the intermediate assertions that were given by the user and justified by
the system.
We wrote a script to translate the proofs to Coq’s language. The translation
is relatively easy as the proofs steps used by the proof debugger are small.
Our translation generate a proof in the traditional language of Coq, not in
the declarative language introduced by Corbineau [16] because this language is
not maintained. But, the formal proofs we generate are in the declarative style:
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Lemma lemma_Playfair :
forall A B C D E,
Par A B C D -> Par A B C E ->
Col C D E.
Proof.
intros.
assert (neq A B) by (conclude_def Par ).
assert (neq C D) by (conclude_def Par ).
assert (~ ~ (CR A D B C \/ CR A C B D)).
{
intro.
assert (Par A B D C) by (forward_using lemma_parallelflip).
assert (CR A C D B) by (conclude lemma_crisscross).
let Tf:=fresh in
assert (Tf:exists p, (BetS A p C /\ BetS D p B)) by (conclude_def CR );
destruct Tf as [p];spliter.
assert (neq D B) by (forward_using lemma_betweennotequal).
assert (neq B D) by (conclude lemma_inequalitysymmetric).
assert (BetS B p D) by (conclude axiom_betweennesssymmetry).
assert (CR A C B D) by (conclude_def CR ).
contradict.
}
assert (Col C D E).
by cases on (CR A D B C \/ CR A C B D).
{
assert (Col C D E) by (conclude lemma_Playfairhelper2).
close.
}
{
let Tf:=fresh in
assert (Tf:exists p, (BetS A p C /\ BetS B p D)) by (conclude_def CR );
destruct Tf as [p];spliter.
assert (CR B D A C) by (conclude_def CR ).
assert (Par B A C D) by (forward_using lemma_parallelflip).
assert (Par B A C E) by (forward_using lemma_parallelflip).
assert (Col C D E) by (conclude lemma_Playfairhelper2).
close.
}
(** cases *)
close.
Qed.
Figure 10: Example proof in Coq
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for case distinctions we give explicitly the statement which is used instead of
the name of the hypothesis, the proofs are purely in the forward chaining style,
based on sequences of applications of the standard Coq tactic assert. We do not
introduce hypothesis numbers. The existential statements and conjunctions are
eliminated as soon as they appear by introducing the witness and decomposing
the conjunction. The assertions are justified using some ad-hoc tactics which
use some automation and congruence closure. We had to circumvent some
weakness of Coq’s automation. Coq is not able to use efficiently lemmas of the
form ∀xyz, Pxyz → Pyzx ∧ Pyxz, because the apply tactic will always choose
to unify the goal with the first term of the conjunction. The standard way to
state such a lemma in Coq is to split the lemmas in two parts. But, we did not
want to modify the original formalization of the lemmas. Hence, to circumvent
this limitation, we verified these proof steps using a tactic based on forward-
chaining. The case distinction tactic allows to distinguish cases on previously
proved disjunctions or disjunctions which are classical tautologies. The tactic
can deal with n-ary disjunctions. The proof script is structured using curly
brackets and indentation. Each proof step of the original proof corresponds to
one proof step in Coq, except that steps for which there is no justification in
the original proofs. Those steps correspond to the natural deduction rule for
introduction of implication and are implemented using the standard Coq tactic
intro. All tactics are designed such that the names of the geometric objects
are preserved from the original proofs but the names of the hypotheses are
automatically generated by Coq and not used explicitly in the proofs. Figure 10
displays the proof of Playfair’s axiom of uniqueness of parallels in Coq’s language
enriched by the tactics to ease the verification. Some of the predicates have been
renamed into longer names to enhance readability and to match the names used
in the GeoCoq library. The proofs are verified using classical logic. The proofs
can be checked by Coq in about 90 seconds using an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700
CPU @ 3.60GH with 32Go RAM.
13.3 Verifying the statements
When evaluating a formalization, even if we trust the proof checker, we need to
check that statements are formalized faithfully. Usually the only method we can
use for this process is to check the statements by human inspection and trust the
reviewer to also check the statements. For this formalization, we were lucky, as
many statements had been formalized independently by the first author and the
GeoCoq team. To improve the confidence in the formalization, we compared the
two formalizations of the statements to detect potential defects. We detected
only minor differences in some of the statements.
14 The axioms hold in R2
The axioms fall into two groups: those that are variants of Tarski’s axioms A1–
A10, and the equal-figure axioms. In order to make sure that there is no mistake
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in the axiomatization, we wished to check formally that the axioms hold in the
Cartesian plane R2. For reasons of convenience, we checked that for the first
group of axioms in Coq, and for the equal-figure axioms in HOL Light. We will
discuss these two verifications separately.
It has already been checked [7] that Tarski’s axioms hold in R2. In Tarski’s
A1–A10, without dimension axioms, one can (formally) verify our axioms, which
are mainly different from Tarksi’s by using strict betweenness and hence avoiding
degenerate cases. This has also been verified in Coq.
14.1 Verifying the Tarski-style axioms in Coq
Since there is no dimension axiom, the “intended model” is Rn, for any integer
n > 1. More generally, we wish to prove that if F is a Euclidean field, then Fn
satisfies our axioms. We break this claim into four parts.
(i) our axioms for neutral geometry can be derived from the corresponding
Tarski’s axioms.
(ii) circle-circle, circle-line, and Euclid 5 can be derived from the correspond-
ing axioms from Tarski.
(iii) Tarski’s axioms hold in Fn. By “Tarski’s axioms“ we mean those of our
axioms that expressed using betweenness and equidistance. (These are similar
to the axioms and some theorems of Tarski’s geometry, except we use strict
betweenness.)
(iv) the equal-figure axioms hold in Fn.
The reason for passing through Tarski’s axioms is that it has already been
shown that Tarski’s axioms for neutral geometry hold in F2, when F is a
Pythagorean ordered field. 24 Specifically, Boutry and Cohen have formal-
ized the proof that the Cartesian plane over a Pythagorean ordered field is a
model of our formalization of Tarski’s axioms A1–A10 using ssreflect [5].
Ad (ii). We chose to assume the circle-circle intersection property and use
the formal proof obtained by Gries and the second author that the circle-line
intersection property can be derived from circle-circle intersection, even without
assuming a parallel postulate [22]. Gries also formalized the proof that circle-
circle intersection can be derived from the continuity axiom of Tarski (Dedekind
cuts restricted to first-order definable sets). As Euc axiom system assumes that
we have a sort for circles, we need to define the type of circles from Tarski’s
axioms (and Coq’s Calculus of Inductive Constructions CIC). The type of circles
is defined as the triple of points (* is interpreted in this context as the Cartesian
product).
Definition Tcircle : Type := Tpoint*Tpoint*Tpoint %type.
Then the predicate CI can be defined by:
Definition CI (J:Tcircle) A C D := J=(A,C,D) /\ C<>D.
24Recall that a Pythagorean field, is a field where sums of squares are squares.
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Then the relation expressing that a point is on a circle can be defined by de-
structing the triple:
Definition OnCirc P (C:Tcircle) :=
match C with
(X,A,B) => tarski_axioms.Cong X P A B
end.
For Euclid 5, we rely on the proofs of equivalence between different versions
of the parallel postulates studied previously by the first author [3] and formalized
in Coq, by Boutry, Gries, Schreck and the second author [8].
14.2 Verifying the equal-figure axioms
We here outline the verification that the equal-figure axioms hold in R2. We did
not verify them in Fn or even Rn, because we wanted to use the (scalar) cross
product in R2 and the existing tools for real and vector algebra in HOL Light.
We interpret points as members of the HOL Light type real^2. We write
that here as R2. Then we define the dot product and the two-dimensional cross
product as usual:
(a, b) · (c, d) = ac+ bd
(a, b)× (c, d) = ad− bc
Twice the signed area of a triangle abc is defined by
tarea(a, b, c) = (c− a)× (b− a).
We define ET (equal triangles) by saying that two triangles are equal if the
absolute values of their signed areas are equal. That is, ET (a, b, c, p, q, r) means
|tarea(a, b, c)|= |tarea(p, q, r)|.
Twice the signed area of a quadrilateral abcd is given by the cross product of
its diagonals:
sarea4(a, b, c, d) = (c− a)× (b − d).
The area of abcd is the absolute value of the signed area. We wish to define EF
(equal quadrilaterals) by saying two quadrilaterals are equal if the squares of
their signed areas are equal. But we do not allow just any four points to be a
quadrilateral. Instead we allow two kinds of quadrilateral, convex quadrilaterals
and ones which are “really triangles“, meaning that one vertex is between two
adjacent vertices. We define abcd to be convex if its diagonals cross, i.e., there is
a point m with B(a,m, c)∧B(b,m, d). In our formal development the condition
0 < area(a, b, c, d) is imposed separately. We interpret EF (a, b, c, d, p, q, r, s) to
mean that abcd and pqrs are each quadrilaterals in this sense, and their areas
are equal.
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Betweenness B(a, b, c) is interpreted (or defined) thus:
B(a, b, c) ↔ ∃t.(b− a) = (c− a) > 0 ∧ 0 < t < 1
These are all the definitions needed to interpret the equal-figures axioms in
R2. We executed this translation by hand, producing a list of sixteen goals
to prove in HOL Light. These theorems turned out not to be as trivial as we
initially thought; the axiom that says congruent triangles are equal required
nearly 2000 lines of HOL Light proof. Even more lines were required for the
last axiom, paste4. Altogether the verification of all 16 equal-figure axioms
required about six thousand lines of HOL Light proofs.
Although theoretically these theorems fall within the domain of quantifier
elimination for the real field, in practice they have too many variables, and
quantifier elimination was not used. Instead, we used rotations and translations
to reduce the complexity, and used only the standard vector-algebra theorems
that are distributed with HOL Light. Many of the axioms are consequences of
the additivity of area, so we proved them by first proving (four or five different
forms of) the additivity of area, and then deriving the axioms from the addi-
tivity of area. Numerous lemmas seemed to be required. Just to mention two
examples:
(i) between norm, which says that B(a, b, c) is equivalent to the “norm con-
dition”,
|b − a|+|c− b|= |c− a|.
(ii) If abcd is a convex quadrilateral (its diagonals meet), and has positive
area, then ab and cd have no point in common.
As mentioned, we used the scalar cross-product to define area. Alternately,
we could have used the definition of area by Lebesgue measure, which already
exists in the HOL Light library. Since we did not do that, we cannot say for
certain that it would not have been easier, but there certainly would have been
many details and extra lemmas in that approach as well.
14.3 An inconsistency and its repair
Our equal-figure axioms include axioms about cutting and pasting equal figures
to get other equal figures. See Fig. 6 for an example, namely paste3, which is
about pasting together triangles with a common side AC to get a quadrilateral
ABCD. This is used in Propositions 35, 42, and 47. Of course we need some-
thing to ensure that the two triangles are in the same plane, and that when
pasted together, they do make a quadrilateral. The obvious hypothesis is that
B and D are on opposite sides of the common side AC, and that was our first
formulation.
Our equal-figure axioms also include axiom cutoff2, which says that if we
cut equal triangles off of equal quadrilaterals, with one end of the cut at a vertex
and the other on a non-adjacent side, the results are equal quadrilaterals. This
axiom is used only once, in Prop. 43; that step of Euclid’s proof is justified by
common notion 3, about subtracting equals from equals. We formulated this
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axiom without any formal statement that the resulting quadrilateral is in fact
a quadrilateral; nor does Euclid have any such justification in his proof.
It turned out, as we discovered when attempting to verify that the axioms
hold in R2, that these two formulations are inconsistent: This version of paste3
permits the creation of a non-convex quadrilateralABCD in which diagonalBD
passes outside the quadrilateral. Then when we attempt to cut off a triangle
BAP with P on AD, the triangle is outside rather than inside, so the area of
the result might be larger, rather than smaller, than the area of ABCD. This
phenomenon leads to an inconsistency.
There are two possible ways to remedy this problem: either strengthen the
hypotheses of cutoff2 (requiring that the resulting quadrilateral have crossing
diagonals), or strengthen the hypotheses of paste3 (requiring that ABCD have
diagonals that cross, or meet at A or C). Either way works. Which is more
faithful to Euclid? Since these axioms are used only a few times in Euclid, it is
not a matter of much importance. The argument against modifying cutoff2 is
that we would then have to verify the added condition in the proof of Prop. 43,
which Euclid evidently felt no need to do, and which would probably double
the length of the proof of Prop. 43. The argument against modifying paste3
is that it might not suffice for a proof that requires constructing a non-convex
quadrilateral. But there are no non-convex quadrilaterals in Books I-III, so we
chose to modify paste3 rather than cutoff2. This permits us to apply these
axioms in Euclid’s proofs without adding more steps.
15 Previous work on computer checking geom-
etry
Work on computerizing Euclidean geometry began in 1959, in the first decade of
the computer age, with the pioneering work of Gelernter [19, 20]. (The reference
has a later date because it is a reprinting in a collection.) The axiom system used
by Gelernter was not given explicitly, but from the example proofs given, it can
be seen that it was, at least in effect, a points-only system. It was a strong axiom
system, including for example all the triangle congruence theorems, Euclid 4,
some strong but unspecified betweenness axioms. Tarski is not referenced; that
is not surprising as Tarski’s first publication of his axiom systems was also in
1959. Gelernter’s system was claimed to be as good as “all but the best” high
school geometry students. Considering the primitive hardware and software of
1959, it was an amazing program. However, its authors stated that they viewed
geometry as just one area in which to study heuristic reasoning, and neither
the program nor its underlying formal theory ever raised its head above water
again.
As far as we know, nineteen years passed before the next work in computer-
izing geometry; it was 1978 when Wen-Tsu¨n Wu [45] began a series of papers on
the subject, culminating in his 1984 book, published only in Chinese, and not
available in English until 1994 [46]. He was soon assisted by S. C. Chou [12, 13].
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Using coordinates, one reduces a geometry theorem to an implication between
polynomial equations. One can then demonstrate the truth of a geometry the-
orem by algebraic methods. Such algebraic methods, while they may succeed
in establishing the validity of a theorem, do not provide a proof from geometric
axioms. One might check the correctness of Euclid’s results this way, but not
his proofs. One problem with this approach is that it works only for problems
that involve equality, not for problems that involve betweenness or inequality.
A second problem is that Wu’s method requires polynomials with hundreds of
variables, and hence does not produce human-comprehensible proofs. Never-
theless, Wu and Wang, Gao, Chou, Ko, and Hussain proved many theorems.
Within a few years three different groups began to use Gro¨bner bases to do the
algebraic work, instead of the Wu-Ritt algorithm. See [26], [27], [15].
Sometime after 1984, Chou invented the area method, which still uses polyno-
mial computations, but based on certain geometric invariants. The area method,
as an algorithm for solving geometry problems, can be used by humans and has
even been used to train students for Olympiad-style competitions. [14], p. xi.
For the state of the art in area-method implementation as of 1994, see [14],
where more than four hundred computer-produced and human-readable proofs
are given. However, the steps of these proofs are equations, whose truth is
verified by symbolic computation, not by logic. Also, as with Wu’s method,
inequalities and betweenness cannot be treated.
In the 1980s, Larry Wos experimented with proving geometry theorems in
Tarski’s theory using the theorem-prover OTTER. Then Art Quaife took up
that same project, publishing a paper in 1989 [39], and devoting a chapter of
his 1992 book to it. Wos and Quaife left a number of “challenge problems” un-
solved by OTTER. In this same decade, the book [40] was published, containing
the results from Gupta’s thesis [23] and Szmielew’s Berkeley course, together
constituting a systematic development of “absolute geometry” (no circle or con-
tinuity axioms) from Tarski’s axioms. This book was quite rigorous, but not
(yet) computer-checked. It also did not reach even to the beginning of Euclid.
Twenty years later, the first author and Wos returned to this project, and used
OTTER to find proofs of all the challenge problems of Quaife, and the first ten
chapters of [40] (Part I). But since [40] spends a lot of effort developing “elemen-
tary” results from minimal axioms (no circle axioms and postponing the parallel
postulate as long as possible), the propositions of Euclid are not reached. In
this project, the more difficult proofs were not found automatically, but instead
the theorem prover was used almost like a proof checker, by means of supplying
“hints.” Therefore, when we wanted to proceed to proof check Euclid, it seemed
appropriate to switch from a theorem prover to a proof checker, which is what
we did for this work.
In 2009, Avigad, Dean, and Mumma [1] reported on a formal system for
Euclid’s Elements. This system is six-sorted (points, lines, circles, segments,
angles, and “areas” (figures), and therefore has also a large number of primitive
relations, including “same side” and “opposite side”. The axiom system of E
differs from ours, because it contains more axioms. They assume 20 construc-
tions axioms, 34 axioms about the two-side, inside and betweenness relations
38
which they call “diagrammatic inferences.” Their system is intended for two-
dimensional geometry only, a restriction deliberately avoided in our system.
They also assume that distances and areas can be measured using a linearly
ordered abelian group. We follow Euclid in not assigning measures to distance
or area; one may compare distances or areas (figures), but not measure them.
The intention of those authors (see §6 of [1]) was to build an interactive
proof checker (with application to education). They wanted to separate the
“diagrammatic inferences” from the inferences that Euclid wrote out, using an
algebraic program for the diagrammatic inferences and a prover for the others.
The steps that Euclid omitted would be done by algebra instead of by logic. This
is a “hybrid” approach, halfway between the completely axiomatic approach and
the computer-algebra techniques of verifying geometry theorems by converting
them to equations. So far, it has not been made to work25 , but even if it did
work, we would still prefer the completely axiomatic approach, which is part of
the tradition extending all the way from Euclid, through Hilbert and Tarski, to
the present.
Starting in 2007, and still continuing as this is written in 2018, the second
author of this paper and Gabriel Braun have been busy computer-checking ge-
ometrical theorems in the proof assistant Coq. They verified Pappus’s theorem
[11] (which is important for the geometrical definition of arithmetic). They ver-
ified that Hilbert’s axioms follow from Tarski’s [10]. With Pierre Boutry, they
verified that Tarski’s axioms follow from Hilbert’s [9], and completed [6] the
verification of the theorems in Szmielew’s part of [40], which the second author
began (with other co-authors) in [41]. Work is currently being done toward
checking Euclid’s propositions from Hilbert/Tarski axioms within Coq. This
work differs from the work presented in this paper, because the goal is not to
verify Euclid’s proofs but Euclid’s statements using an axiom system as minimal
as possible.
For further information, please see the forthcoming survey article [34].
16 How wrong was Euclid?
The point that has given rise to the most discussion when our work has been
presented is not whether our proofs are certifiably correct, but whether Euclid’s
proofs are really wrong, or “how wrong” they are. Therefore we address this
issue explicitly. We classify the problems with Euclid’s proofs into
• Missing axioms (circle axioms, Pasch, betweenness on a line)
• Gaps (correctable failures to prove collinearity or non-collinearity or be-
tweenness)
25Kenneth Manders has studied the role of diagrams in Euclidean proofs and argue that
the use of diagrams in Euclid is limited to some class of properties [28]. Luengo and Mumma
have proposed formal systems which intend to capture the obvious spatial properties as built
in inference rules [33], but both systems have been shown by Miller to be inconsistent [29, 31].
Miller has proposed another system, but the number of cases which should be considered
renders the diagrammatic system difficult to use in practice [30].
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• Superfluous axioms: theory of angles (angle equality and order can be
defined and its properties proved, rather than assumed).
• Difficult theorems “justified” by common notions. For example, it can be
proved that an angle cannot be less than itself. Euclid uses this at the
end of I.7 without given any justification at all. Hilbert does no better:
he assumes it by including uniqueness in his angle-copying axiom.
• Superfluous axioms: Postulate IV (all right angles are equal) can be
proved, though a correct proof is rather difficult.
• Out and out errors. We have mentioned Euclid’s incorrect proof of the
angle bisection proposition I.9, and his uncorrectable proof of I.7. Euclid’s
errors, and our correct proofs of his propositions, deserve a full discussion,
but that will be lengthy and is postponed to a future publication. Our
purpose in this paper is to discuss the proof-checking, not the geometry,
i.e., not the proofs themselves.
17 Conclusion
Our aim was to remove every flaw from Euclid’s axioms, definitions, postulates,
and common notions, and give formal proofs of all the propositions in Book I.
Did we achieve that aim?
The statements of the postulates and the definitions needed little if any
change; it is the axioms and proofs that needed corrections. We replaced Euclid’s
axioms and postulates by similar ones in a language similar to Tarski’s, but
using strict betweenness. We added line-circle and circle-circle axioms, and
both inner and outer Pasch; we added the five-line axiom to enable a correct
proof of the SAS congruence criterion (Prop. I.2). We dropped Postulate 4
(all right angles are equal) because it can be proved, and formulated Postulate
5 (the parallel postulate) in our points-only language. Inequality of lines and
angles, and equality of angles, become defined concepts and the common notions
concerning those concepts become theorems. We used Tarski’s definition of
“same side”, an essential concept which Euclid mentioned but neither defined
nor considered as a common notion. We used Euclid’s rather than Tarski’s
extension axiom, so that Euclid’s I.2 would not be superfluous. We think that
this choice of axioms is very close to Euclid’s.
With this choice of axioms, we were able to prove Euclid’s propositions I.1 to
I.48. These proofs follow Euclid as closely as possible, and have been checked in
two well-known and respected proof checkers. We have therefore shown beyond
a shadow of a doubt that these proofs are correct. Then we checked, again using
those same proof checkers, that the axioms we used hold in R2. In particular
all of Euclid’s propositions in Book I and corrected proofs of those propositions,
close to Euclid’s ideas, are valid, without a shadow of a doubt, in Euclidean
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two-space.26 While many paper-and-pencil formalizations of Euclid have been
put forward in the past, we are the first to be able to make this claim. That this
was not a superfluous exercise is shown by the many difficulties we encountered,
and the fact that we had to prove the propositions in quite a different order than
Euclid, and in some cases by different proofs. In this paper we have focused on
the axioms and the proof checking. A subsequent publication will present the
geometrical difficulties and compare our proofs in detail to those of Euclid.
To play the devil’s advocate, what argument could be made that we did not
achieve the aim stated above? One might complain that we proved the propo-
sitions in a different order than Euclid did. We had to do that, because we
could not prove them in the original order using our axioms. The devil might
argue that we should have strengthened the circle-circle axiom to provide for
an intersection point of the two circles on a given side of the line joining the
centers. With this stronger axiom we could have fixed Euclid’s proof of I.9 (an-
gle bisection) and used it as Euclid did to bisect a line. But this would amount
to assuming, rather than proving, the existence of erected perpendiculars, mid-
points, and angle bisectors. Besides, it would not have fixed the other problems
we had with the ordering of theorems, and the proof we gave, using midpoints to
bisect angles rather than bisection of angles to construct midpoints, is beautiful,
even if it was discovered by Gupta more than two thousand years after Euclid.
We think that the devil would be wrong to say we should have strengthened
circle-circle, and we therefore claim that we did indeed remove every flaw from
Euclid’s axioms, definitions, postulates, and common notions, and give correct
proofs of the propositions in Book I.
18 Appendix 1: Formal proof of Prop. I.1
The reader may compare the following proof to Euclid’s. The conclusion ELABC,
that ABC is equilateral, is reached about halfway through, and that corresponds
to the end of Euclid’s proof. The firsts half of our proof corresponds fairly
naturally to Euclid’s, except for quoting the circle-circle axiom, and verifying
that is hypotheses are satisfied.
The last half of our proof is devoted to proving that ABC is a triangle, that
is, the three points are not collinear. Note the use of lemma
partnotequalwhole. If Euclid had noticed the need to prove that ABC actually
is a triangle, he would have justified it using the common notions, applied to
equality (congruence) of lines. This version of “the part is not equal to the
whole” is not an axiom for us, but a theorem.
At the request of the referee we present this proof in a typeset form rather
than in its native Polish form. Obviously further mechanical processing can
increase its superficial resemblance to Euclid’s style, but the point of our present
work is simply its mechanically-checked correctness.
26They hold in Euclidean n-space too, since there is no dimension axiom, but we did not
formally check that.
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Appendix 1: Formal proof of Prop. I.1
Proposition 18.1 (Prop. I.1) On a given finite straight line to construct an
equilateral triangle.
∀AB A 6= B →∃X ABX is equilateral ∧ ABX is a triangle
Proof Let J be such that J is the circle of center A and radius AB by postu-
late Euclid3.
B 6= A by lemma inequalitysymmetric.
Let K be such that K is the circle of center B and radius BA by postulate
Euclid3.
Let D be such that A is strictly between B and D ∧ AD ∼= AB by lemma
localextension.
AD ∼= BA by lemma congruenceflip.
BA ∼= BA by common notion congruencereflexive.
D is outside circle K by definition of outside.
B = B by common notion equalityreflexive.
B is inside circle K by definition of inside.
AB ∼= AB by common notion congruencereflexive.
B is on circle J by definition of on.
D is on circle J by definition of on.
A = A by common notion equalityreflexive.
A is inside circle J by definition of inside.
Let C be such that C is on circle K ∧ C is on circle J by postulate circle-
circle.
AC ∼= AB by axiom circle-center-radius.
AB ∼= AC by lemma congruencesymmetric.
BC ∼= BA by axiom circle-center-radius.
BC ∼= AB by lemma congruenceflip.
BC ∼= AC by lemma congruencetransitive.
AB ∼= BC by lemma congruencesymmetric.
AC ∼= CA by common notion equalityreverse.
BC ∼= CA by lemma congruencetransitive.
ABC is equilateral by definition of equilateral.
B 6= C by axiom nocollapse.
C 6= A by axiom nocollapse.
Let show that C is strictly between A and B does not hold by contradiction:
{
AC 6∼= AB by lemma partnotequalwhole.
CA ∼= AC by common notion equalityreverse.
CA ∼= AB by lemma congruencetransitive.
AC ∼= CA by common notion equalityreverse.
AC ∼= AB by lemma congruencetransitive.
We have a contradiction.
}
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Let show that B is strictly between A and C does not hold by contradiction:
{
AB 6∼= AC by lemma partnotequalwhole.
AB ∼= CA by lemma congruencetransitive.
CA ∼= AC by common notion equalityreverse.
AB ∼= AC by lemma congruencetransitive.
We have a contradiction.
}
Let show that A is strictly between B and C does not hold by contradiction:
{
BA 6∼= BC by lemma partnotequalwhole.
BA ∼= AB by common notion equalityreverse.
BA ∼= BC by lemma congruencetransitive.
We have a contradiction.
}
Let show that ABC are collinear does not hold by contradiction:
{
A 6= C by lemma inequalitysymmetric.
A = B ∨ A = C ∨ B = C ∨ A is strictly between B and C ∨ B is strictly between A and C ∨
C is strictly between A and B by definition of collinear.
We have a contradiction.
}
ABC is a triangle by definition of triangle.
Appendix 2: Axioms and Definitions
The following formulas are presented in a format that can be cut and pasted,
even from a pdf file.
Definitions
A and B are distinct points
NE(A,B) :=
~ EQ(A,B)
A, B, and C are collinear
CO(A,B,C) :=
EQ(A,B) \/ EQ(A,C) \/ EQ(B,C) \/ BE(B,A,C) \/ BE(A,B,C) \/
BE(A,C,B)
A, B, and C are not collinear
NC(A,B,C) :=
NE(A,B) /\ NE(A,C) /\ NE(B,C) /\ ~BE(A,B,C) /\ ~BE(A,C,B) /\
~BE(B,A,C)
P is inside (some) circle J of center C and radius AB
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IC(P,J) :=
exists X Y U V W, CI(J,U,V,W) /\ (EQ(P,U) \/ BE(U,Y,X) /\
EE(U,X,V,W) /\ EE(U,P,U,Y))
P is outside (some) circle J of center U and radius VW
OC(P,J) :=
exists X U V W, CI(J,U,V,W) /\ BE(U,X,P) /\ EE(U,X,V,W)
B is on (some) circle J of center U and radius XY
ON(B,J) :=
exists X Y U, CI(J,U,X,Y) /\ EE(U,B,X,Y)
ABC is equilateral
EL(A,B,C) :=
EE(A,B,B,C) /\ EE(B,C,C,A)
ABC is a triangle
TR(A,B,C) :=
NC(A,B,C)
C lies on ray AB
RA(A,B,C) :=
exists X, BE(X,A,C) /\ BE(X,A,B)
AB is less than CD
LT(A,B,C,D) :=
exists X, BE(C,X,D) /\ EE(C,X,A,B)
B is the midpoint of AC
MI(A,B,C) :=
BE(A,B,C) /\ EE(A,B,B,C)
Angle ABC is equal to angle abc
EA(A,B,C,a,b,c) :=
exists U V u v, RA(B,A,U) /\ RA(B,C,V) /\ RA(b,a,u) /\
RA(b,c,v) /\ EE(B,U,b,u) /\ EE(B,V,b,v) /\ EE(U,V,u,v) /\
NC(A,B,C)
DBF is a supplement of ABC
SU(A,B,C,D,F) :=
RA(B,C,D) /\ BE(A,B,F)
ABC is a right angle
RR(A,B,C) :=
exists X, BE(A,B,X) /\ EE(A,B,X,B) /\ EE(A,C,X,C) /\ NE(B,C)
PQ is perpendicular to AB at C and NCABP
PA(P,Q,A,B,C) :=
exists X, CO(P,Q,C) /\ CO(A,B,C) /\ CO(A,B,X) /\ RR(X,C,P)
PQ is perpendicular to AB
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PE(P,Q,A,B) :=
exists X, PA(P,Q,A,B,X)
P is in the interior of angle ABC
IA(A,B,C,P) :=
exists X Y, RA(B,A,X) /\ RA(B,C,Y) /\ BE(X,P,Y)
P and Q are on opposite sides of AB
OS(P,A,B,Q) :=
exists X, BE(P,X,Q) /\ CO(A,B,X) /\ NC(A,B,P)
P and Q are on the same side of AB
SS(P,Q,A,B) :=
exists X U V, CO(A,B,U) /\ CO(A,B,V) /\ BE(P,U,X) /\ BE(Q,V,X)
/\ NC(A,B,P) /\ NC(A,B,Q)
ABC is isosceles with base BC
IS(A,B,C) :=
TR(A,B,C) /\ EE(A,B,A,C)
AB cuts CD in E
CU(A,B,C,D,E) :=
BE(A,E,B) /\ BE(C,E,D) /\ NC(A,B,C) /\ NC(A,B,D)
Triangle ABC is congruent to abc
TC(A,B,C,a,b,c) :=
EE(A,B,a,b) /\ EE(B,C,b,c) /\ EE(A,C,a,c) /\ TR(A,B,C)
Angle ABC is less than angle DEF
AO(A,B,C,D,E,F) :=
exists U X V, BE(U,X,V) /\ RA(E,D,U) /\ RA(E,F,V) /\
EA(A,B,C,D,E,X)
AB and CD are together greater than EF
TG(A,B,C,D,E,F) :=
exists X, BE(A,B,X) /\ EE(B,X,C,D) /\ LT(E,F,A,X)
AB, CD are together greater than EF,GH
TT(A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H) :=
exists X, BE(E,F,X) /\ EE(F,X,G,H) /\ TG(A,B,C,D,E,X)
ABC and DEF make together two right angles
RT(A,B,C,D,E,F) :=
exists X Y Z U V, SU(X,Y,U,V,Z) /\ EA(A,B,C,X,Y,U) /\
EA(D,E,F,V,Y,Z)
AB meets CD
ME(A,B,C,D) :=
exists X, NE(A,B) /\ NE(C,D) /\ CO(A,B,X) /\ CO(C,D,X)
AB crosses CD
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CR(A,B,C,D) :=
exists X, BE(A,X,B) /\ BE(C,X,D)
AB and CD are Tarski parallel
TP(A,B,C,D) :=
NE(A,B) /\ NE(C,D) /\ ~ ME(A,B,C,D) /\ SS(C,D,A,B)
AB and CD are parallel
PR(A,B,C,D) :=
exists U V u v X, NE(A,B) /\ NE(C,D) /\ CO(A,B,U) /\ CO(A,B,V)
/\ NE(U,V) /\ CO(C,D,u) /\ CO(C,D,v) /\ NE(u,v) /\ ~
ME(A,B,C,D) /\ BE(U,X,v) /\ BE(u,X,V)
ABC and DEF are together equal to PQR
AS(A,B,C,D,E,F,P,Q,R) :=
exists X, EA(A,B,C,P,Q,X) /\ EA(D,E,F,X,Q,R) /\ BE(P,X,R)
ABCD is a parallelogram
PG(A,B,C,D) :=
PR(A,B,C,D) /\ PR(A,D,B,C)
ABCD is a square
SQ(A,B,C,D) :=
EE(A,B,C,D) /\ EE(A,B,B,C) /\ EE(A,B,D,A) /\ RR(D,A,B) /\
RR(A,B,C) /\ RR(B,C,D) /\ RR(C,D,A)
ABCD is a rectangle
RE(A,B,C,D) :=
RR(D,A,B) /\ RR(A,B,C) /\ RR(B,C,D) /\ RR(C,D,A) /\ CR(A,C,B,D)
ABCD and abcd are congruent rectangles
RC(A,B,C,D,a,b,c,d) :=
RE(A,B,C,D) /\ RE(a,b,c,d) /\ EE(A,B,a,b) /\ EE(B,C,b,c)
ABCD and abcd are equal rectangles
ER(A,B,C,D,a,b,c,d) :=
exists X Y Z U x z u w W, RC(A,B,C,D,X,Y,Z,U) /\
RC(a,b,c,d,x,Y,z,u) /\ BE(x,Y,Z) /\ BE(X,Y,z) /\ BE(W,U,w)
ABCD is a base rectangle of triangle BCE
BR(A,B,C,D,E) :=
RE(B,C,D,E) /\ CO(D,E,A)
ABC and abc are equal triangles
TE(A,B,C,a,b,c) :=
exists X Y x y, RE(A,B,X,Y) /\ RE(a,b,x,y) /\ CO(X,Y,C) /\
CO(x,y,c) /\ ER(A,B,X,Y,a,b,x,y)
ABCD and abcd are equal quadrilaterals
FE(A,B,C,D,a,b,c,d) :=
exists X Y Z U x y z u, OS(A,B,C,D) /\ OS(a,b,c,d) /\
FR(A,B,C,D,X,Y,Z,U) /\ FR(a,b,c,d,x,y,z,u) /\
ER(X,Y,Z,U,x,y,z,u)
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Common Notions
cn-equalitytransitive
forall A B C, EQ(A,C) /\ EQ(B,C) ==> EQ(A,B)
cn-congruencetransitive
forall B C D E P Q, EE(P,Q,B,C) /\ EE(P,Q,D,E) ==> EE(B,C,D,E)
cn-equalityreflexive
forall A, EQ(A,A)
cn-congruencereflexive
forall A B, EE(A,B,A,B)
cn-equalityreverse
forall A B, EE(A,B,B,A)
cn-sumofparts
forall A B C a b c, EE(A,B,a,b) /\ EE(B,C,b,c) /\ BE(A,B,C) /\
BE(a,b,c) ==> EE(A,C,a,c)
cn-stability
forall A B, ~ NE(A,B) ==> EQ(A,B)
cn-equalitysub
forall A B C D, EQ(D,A) /\ BE(A,B,C) ==> BE(D,B,C)
Axioms of betweenness and congruence
axiom -betweennessidentity
forall A B, ~BE(A,B,A)
axiom -betweennesssymmetry
forall A B C, BE(A,B,C) ==> BE(C,B,A)
axiom -innertransitivity
forall A B C D, BE(A,B,D) /\ BE(B,C,D) ==> BE(A,B,C)
axiom -connectivity
forall A B C D, BE(A,B,D) /\ BE(A,C,D) /\ ~BE(A,B,C) /\ ~BE(A,C,B)
==> EQ(B,C)
axiom -nocollapse
forall A B C D, NE(A,B) /\ EE(A,B,C,D) ==> NE(C,D)
axiom -5- line
forall A B C D a b c d, EE(B,C,b,c) /\ EE(A,D,a,d) /\ EE(B,D,b,d)
/\ BE(A,B,C) /\ BE(a,b,c) /\ EE(A,B,a,b) ==> EE(D,C,d,c)
Postulates
postulate -Pasch -inner
forall A B C P Q, BE(A,P,C) /\ BE(B,Q,C) /\ NC(A,C,B) ==> exists
X, BE(A,X,Q) /\ BE(B,X,P)
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postulate -Pasch -outer
forall A B C P Q, BE(A,P,C) /\ BE(B,C,Q) /\ NC(B,Q,A) ==> exists
X, BE(A,X,Q) /\ BE(B,P,X)
postulate -Euclid2
forall A B, NE(A,B) ==> exists X, BE(A,B,X)
postulate -Euclid3
forall A B, NE(A,B) ==> exists X, CI(X,A,A,B)
postulate -line -circle
forall A B C K P Q, CI(K,C,P,Q) /\ IC(B,K) /\ NE(A,B) ==> exists X
Y, CO(A,B,X) /\ BE(A,B,Y) /\ ON(X,K) /\ ON(Y,K) /\ BE(X,B,Y)
postulate -circle -circle
forall C D F G J K P Q R S, CI(J,C,R,S) /\ IC(P,J) /\ OC(Q,J) /\
CI(K,D,F,G) /\ ON(P,K) /\ ON(Q,K) ==> exists X, ON(X,J) /\
ON(X,K)
postulate -Euclid5
forall a p q r s t, BE(r,t,s) /\ BE(p,t,q) /\ BE(r,a,q) /\
EE(p,t,q,t) /\ EE(t,r,t,s) /\ NC(p,q,s) ==> exists X,
BE(p,a,X) /\ BE(s,q,X)
axiom -circle -center -radius
forall A B C J P, CI(J,A,B,C) /\ ON(P,J) ==> EE(A,P,B,C)
Axioms for Equal Figures
axiom -congruentequal
forall A B C a b c, TC(A,B,C,a,b,c) ==> ET(A,B,C,a,b,c)
axiom -ETpermutation
forall A B C a b c, ET(A,B,C,a,b,c) ==> ET(A,B,C,b,c,a) /\
ET(A,B,C,a,c,b) /\ ET(A,B,C,b,a,c) /\ ET(A,B,C,c,b,a) /\
ET(A,B,C,c,a,b)
axiom -ETsymmetric
forall A B C a b c, ET(A,B,C,a,b,c) ==> ET(a,b,c,A,B,C)
axiom -EFpermutation
forall A B C D a b c d, EF(A,B,C,D,a,b,c,d) ==>
EF(A,B,C,D,b,c,d,a) /\ EF(A,B,C,D,d,c,b,a) /\
EF(A,B,C,D,c,d,a,b) /\ EF(A,B,C,D,b,a,d,c) /\
EF(A,B,C,D,d,a,b,c) /\ EF(A,B,C,D,c,b,a,d) /\
EF(A,B,C,D,a,d,c,b)
axiom -halvesofequals
forall A B C D a b c d, ET(A,B,C,B,C,D) /\ OS(A,B,C,D) /\
ET(a,b,c,b,c,d) /\ OS(a,b,c,d) /\ EF(A,B,D,C,a,b,d,c) ==>
ET(A,B,C,a,b,c)
axiom -EFsymmetric
forall A B C D a b c d, EF(A,B,C,D,a,b,c,d) ==> EF(a,b,c,d,A,B,C,D)
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axiom -EFtransitive
forall A B C D P Q R S a b c d, EF(A,B,C,D,a,b,c,d) /\
EF(a,b,c,d,P,Q,R,S) ==> EF(A,B,C,D,P,Q,R,S)
axiom -ETtransitive
forall A B C P Q R a b c, ET(A,B,C,a,b,c) /\ ET(a,b,c,P,Q,R) ==>
ET(A,B,C,P,Q,R)
axiom -cutoff1
forall A B C D E a b c d e, BE(A,B,C) /\ BE(a,b,c) /\ BE(E,D,C) /\
BE(e,d,c) /\ ET(B,C,D,b,c,d) /\ ET(A,C,E,a,c,e) ==>
EF(A,B,D,E,a,b,d,e)
axiom -cutoff2
forall A B C D E a b c d e, BE(B,C,D) /\ BE(b,c,d) /\
ET(C,D,E,c,d,e) /\ EF(A,B,D,E,a,b,d,e) ==> EF(A,B,C,E,a,b,c,e)
axiom -paste1
forall A B C D E a b c d e, BE(A,B,C) /\ BE(a,b,c) /\ BE(E,D,C) /\
BE(e,d,c) /\ ET(B,C,D,b,c,d) /\ EF(A,B,D,E,a,b,d,e) ==>
ET(A,C,E,a,c,e)
axiom -deZolt1
forall B C D E, BE(B,E,D) ==> ~ ET(D,B,C,E,B,C)
axiom -deZolt2
forall A B C E F, TR(A,B,C) /\ BE(B,E,A) /\ BE(B,F,C) ==> ~
ET(A,B,C,E,B,F)
axiom -paste2
forall A B C D E M a b c d e m, BE(B,C,D) /\ BE(b,c,d) /\
ET(C,D,E,c,d,e) /\ EF(A,B,C,E,a,b,c,e) /\ BE(A,M,D) /\
BE(B,M,E) /\ BE(a,m,d) /\ BE(b,m,e) ==> EF(A,B,D,E,a,b,d,e)
axiom -paste3
forall A B C D M a b c d m, ET(A,B,C,a,b,c) /\ ET(A,B,D,a,b,d) /\
BE(C,M,D) /\ BE(A,M,B) \/ EQ(A,M) \/ EQ(M,B) /\ BE(c,m,d) /\
BE(a,m,b) \/ EQ(a,m) \/ EQ(m,b) ==> EF(A,C,B,D,a,c,b,d)
axiom -paste4
forall A B C D F G H J K L M P e m, EF(A,B,m,D,F,K,H,G) /\
EF(D,B,e,C,G,H,M,L) /\ BE(A,P,C) /\ BE(B,P,D) /\ BE(K,H,M) /\
BE(F,G,L) /\ BE(B,m,D) /\ BE(B,e,C) /\ BE(F,J,M) /\ BE(K,J,L)
==> EF(A,B,C,D,F,K,M,L)
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